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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the conclusion of World War II several new states have been created as
a result of unilateral non-colonial ("UNC") secession.' These include Bangladesh
(Pakistan), Eritrea (Ethiopia), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Slovenia, Serbia, Kosovo (Yugoslavia), and South Sudan (Sudan).2
Some well-known examples of attempted UJNC secession include Serbian Krajina
(Croatia), Chechnya (Russian Federation), Gagauzia (Moldova), Transnistria
(Moldova), Abkhazia (Georgia),3 and South Ossetia (Georgia).4 These
* Dr. Glen Anderson is a Lecturer in law at Newcastle University Australia and has previously been
employed at the School of Law Macquarie University Australia. He has also published on the definition
of secession in international law and relations with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review (publication forthcoming) and the use of force and unilateral non-colonial
secession with the Connecticut Journal of International Law (publication forthcoming).
1. Secession can be unilateral or consensual. In the case of the former, secession occurs without
the existing state's consent. By contrast, consensual secession receives the existing state's imprimatur.
Consensual secession can be conceptually subdivided into constitutional and politically negotiated
secession. Secession may occur in a colonial or a non-colonial context, as any new assertion of
sovereignty over a colonial territory or part of an existing state involves a modification to the
sovereignty of the metropolitan power or existing state respectively. For scholars who propound that
secession may occur in a colonial or a non-colonial context, see HANNA BOKOR-SZEGO, THE ROLE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 53 (1978); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION
OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 330, 370 (2d ed. 2007); INGRID DETTER DELUPIS, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 14-16 (1st ed. 1974); THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELF-
DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 180-81 (1997); FATSAH OUGUERGOUZ, THE AFRICAN
CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AND
SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 235-36 (2003); PETER RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2002); Christine Haverland, Secession, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 384, 384-87 (10th ed. 1987); Patrick Thomberry, Self-Determination and
Indigenous Peoples: Objections and Responses, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION 39, 52-54 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000); Frank
Przetacznik, The Basic Collective Human Right to Self-Determination of Peoples and Nations as a
Prerequisite for Peace, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 49, 103 (1990-91).
2. South Sudan might alternatively be considered a consensual secession, given that it was
ultimately achieved by way of a referendum. See Anthony J. Christopher, Secession and South Sudan:
an African Precedent for the Future, 93 S. AFR. GEOGRAPHICAL J. 125, 125-132 (2011) (explaining that
an agreement regarding a constitutional means of attaining secession was effective); Peter Radan,
Secessionist Referenda in International and Domestic Law, 18 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLS. 8, 8-21
(2012). It should be noted, however, that this vote was the ultimate culmination of "the longest civil
conflict on the continent [of Africa]." Khalid Medani, Strife and Secession in Sudan, 22 J. DEMOCRACY
135, 135 (2011). The secession of South Sudan might therefore be classified as unilateral in substance.
3. Abkhazia may eventually become a successful UNC secession, given that the Russian
Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Vanuatu, and Tuvalu extended recognition on 26 August
2008, 5 September 2008, 10 September 2009, 15 December 2009, 23 May 2011, and 18 September
2011 respectively. But see Jelena Radoman, Future Kosovo Status - Precedent or Universal Solution, 3
W. BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER 14, 17 (2006). For discussion of the Abkhazia conflict in general,
see Antje Herrberg, Conflict Resolution in Georgia: A Synthesis Analysis with a Legal Perspective,
CRISIS MGMT. INITIATIVE (CMI) (2006), http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CMIGeorgia
conflictresolutionsynthesisanalysis.pdf
4. South Ossetia may eventually become a successful UNC secession, given that the Russian
Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and Tuvalu have extended recognition on Aug 26, 2008,
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examples-along with many others-demonstrate that UNC secession is an
important method of state creation.
The present article examines whether a right to UNC secession is contained in
United Nations ("U.N.") declaratory General Assembly resolutions, and if so, what
might be the legal effect of such a right. Examination of declaratory General
Assembly resolutions is critical to establishing a right to UNC secession in
international law.5 This is because scant-if any-support for such a right can be
found in treaty law. 6 Yet UNC secession is a well-recognised method of state
creation,7 which by its very nature leads to a sovereignty conflict between the
existing state and the (putative) secessionist state. The primary rules invoked for
the resolution of this conflict are those relating to the international law of self-
determination. It is this body of law, as developed and applied primarily by the
U.N., which provides justification for the creation of a new state by way of UNC
secession.
Two declaratory General Assembly resolutions arguably provide a qualified8
right to UNC secession for peoples: The Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations9 ("Friendly Relations
Declaration") and the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the United Nations'o ("Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration"). The article's first half
examines the textual content of these instruments asking two interrelated
questions: first, "what does the term 'peoples' mean?"; and second, "does the law
of self-determination provide peoples-however defined-with a right to UNC
secession?"" Both questions are controversial, with various scholars arguing
Sept. 5, 2008, Sept. 10, 2009, Dec. 15, 2009, and Sept. 19, 2011 respectively. For discussion of the
South Ossetia Conflict in general, see Radoman, supra note 3; Herrberg, supra note 3; Gerard Toal,
Russia's Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War over South Ossetia, 49 EuRASIAN
GEOGRAPHY & EcoN. 670, 670 (2008), available at http://www.colorado.edu/geography/classhornepa
ges/geog_4712_fD8/ToalSouthOssetia.pdf.
5. On the ability of declaratory General Assembly resolutions to influence legal norms generally,
see Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 1.C.J. 226, 70 (July 8);
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 193
(June 27).
6. Such a right can arguably be construed from the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, particularly Articles 20(2) and 20(3). African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul
Charter), art. 20, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58. In any event, this instrument only has narrow application
being solely binding upon African Union states. The African Charter does not establish a general
international legal right to UNC secession.
7. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 375.
8. The right is qualified in the sense that it is not open ended; it is only available to peoples who
have been subject to sustained and systematic discrimination "of any kind" by their existing state. See
G.A. Res. 50/6, U.N. Doc. AIRES/50/6 (Oct. 24, 1995) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 50/6]. The right
contained in these declaratory instruments therefore has a relatively high threshold to meet.
9. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
10. G.A. Res. 50/6, supra note 8.
11. When examining the precise parameters of self-determination in the instruments that follow,
orthodox canons of interpretation will be employed. Whenever possible, key words and phrases will be
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forl2 and against the extension of "peoples" to the non-colonial context and a
right of peoples to UNC secession respectively.
The article's second half investigates the legal effect of declaratory General
Assembly resolutions from a variety of perspectives, including whether they (1)
constitute authentic interpretations of the U.N. Charter, (2) create binding
customary law, (3) serve to create general principles of international law, and (4)
can create new law by way of consensus. This investigation is vital to precisely
understanding the legal effects of textually articulated rights in declaratory General
Assembly resolutions. This is especially the case given the implications of UNC
secession: can declaratory General Assembly resolutions create a right that even
partly undermines the well-established principles of state sovereignty and
territorial integrity?
The article concludes that the Friendly Relations Declaration and Fiftieth
Anniversary Declaration articulate a qualified right to UNC secession, but that this
right will only gain legal effect by way of customary law. Furthermore, it is
determined that a customary law right to UNC secession will only be legally
perfected by state practice in terms of physical acts and omissions. In other words
state practice in relation to UNC secessionist disputes, particularly grants of
recognition to UNC secessionist groups, must be concomitant with the qualified
right to UNC secession articulated in declaratory General Assembly resolutions.
II. THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING
FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS ("FRIENDLY RELATIONS
DECLARATION")
The Friendly Relations Declarationl 4 was adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly in October 1970, and as the name suggests, enumerates principles of
international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states. I5
construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning, with regard for the particular instrument's
"object and purpose," as laid down by Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
When, however, key words and phrases remain "ambiguous or obscure," resort will also be made to the
travaux prdparatoires (preparatory work, normally of a documentary nature) and proc~s verbaux
(preparatory work, documenting oral debate), as enumerated by the Vienna Convention in Article 32(a).
Id. art. 32(a).
12. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 119-20
(1999); RADAN, supra note 1, at 52.
13. See Guyora Binder, The Case for Self-Determination, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 223, 238 (1993);
Donald L. Horowitz, A Right to Secede?, in SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION 50, 64 (Stephen
Macedo & Allen Buchanan eds., 2003).
14. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9.
15. These principles include (1) the prohibition on the threat or use of force, (2) the peaceful
settlement of disputes, (3) non-intervention, (4) the duty to cooperate, (5) equal rights and self-
determination, (6) the sovereign equality of states, and (7) good faith and the fulfilment of obligations.
Id. at pmbl., Ti (a)-(g); Robert Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713, 713 (1971). See generally V.S.
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Principle 5 deals with the "equal rights and self-determination of peoples" and
given its centrality to the present article is reproduced in extenso below:
[1] By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have
the rights freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status and to pursue their economic social and cultural
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
[2] Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate
action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to
render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the
responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the
implementation of the principle, in order:
(a) to promote friendly relations and co-operation among States;
and
(b) to bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to
the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned;
and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as
well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the
Charter.
[3] Every State has a duty to promote through joint and separate action
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in accordance with the Charter.
[4] The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free
association or integration with an independent State or the emergence
into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute
modes of implementing the right of self-determination by the people.
[5] Every State has a duty to refrain from any forcible action which
deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the principle of
their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In
actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the
exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to
seek and receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles
of the Charter.
[6] The territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory has,
under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the
State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the
Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or non-self-governing
MANI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
DEBATES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-
OPERATION AMONG STATES (1993) (giving a detailed analysis of these principles).
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territory have exercised their right to self-determination in accordance
with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles.
[7] Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race,
creed or colour.
[8] Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State
or country.'6
A. The Meaning of "Peoples"
Although the word "peoples" is mentioned in the Declaration's preamble,' 7
Principle 1,18 and Principle 3,19 the first significant application of the term occurs
in Principle 5, paragraph 1:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have
the right freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter.20
Paragraph 1 thus mentions "State[s]" and "peoples" as two separate concepts. It
also creates a nexus between "peoples" and "cultural development," the latter of
which resembles some aspects of the definition of a nation. 21 Additionally,
16. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 123-124.
17. Id. at pmbl.
18. Id. at 122 ("The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations . . .. Every State has the duty to refrain
from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence.").
19. Id. at 123 ("The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter .... The use of force to deprive people of their
national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of the principle of non-
intervention.").
20. Id. at 123 (Principle 5 is "[t]he principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.").
21. "Culture," consisting of language and customs, has long been associated with national
identity. For a similar argument regarding the nexus between "peoples" and "cultural development" in
the context of the U.N. Charter and Article 73(a), see RADAN, supra note 1, at 31. The link between
"culture" and "peoples" also finds support at page 123 of the Friendly Relations Declaration: "[t]he use
of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights
and of the principle of non-intervention." G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 123 (emphasis added).
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paragraph I declares that "all peoples" 22 enjoy the right to self-determination,
which prima facie indicates that "peoples" is an expression of broad and general
applicability extending to the colonial and non-colonial context.23
A similar conclusion is reached by examination of Principle 5, paragraph 2,
which once again mentions "State[s]" and "peoples" as two distinct concepts.24
Furthermore, sub-paragraph 2(b) indicates that peoples may exist in a colonial
context, and then supplements this with the addendum that "subjection of peoples
to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation" is contrary to the U.N.
Charter.25 Unless the latter phrase is pleonastic, it would seem to indicate that
peoples can also exist in a non-colonial context, as situations of "alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation" are not unique to colonisation.
Principle 5, paragraph 4 reiterates, the content of Principle VI of Resolution
154126 regarding the methods by which a people may exercise their right to
external self-determination.27 However, unlike Principle VI, the paragraph does
not explicitly seek to limit the application of its content to colonial peoples. This
difference is crucial, as it arguably opens the possibility for paragraph 4 to apply to
non-colonial peoples. Paragraph 4 would thus seem to comport with the meaning
of "peoples" as deduced from paragraphs 1 and 2.
Principle 5, paragraph 5 deals with the duty of "states" to refrain from action
that would deprive "peoples" of their right to self-determination. The paragraph's
phraseology therefore implicitly reaffirms that states and peoples are two distinct
concepts. Furthermore, if it is accepted that paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 imply that
peoples may exist in a colonial and non-colonial context, it follows that the
directive contained in paragraph 5 must also apply to peoples in a colonial and
non-colonial context.
Principle 5, paragraph 6 deals exclusively with peoples in a colonial context,
as indicated by the opening phrase, "[t]he territory of a colony or other Non-Self-
Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the
22. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 123 (emphasis added).
23. See gukovi6, who when contemplating the meaning of "peoples" within the Friendly Relations
Declaration notes that "[i]n the end the opinion prevailed that the right of peoples to self-determination
had a universal character and that this right belonged to all peoples regardless of whether they had
gained independence or not." Olga gukovid, Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of
Peoples, in PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND
COOPERATION 323, 346 (Milan gahovid ed., 1972) (emphasis in original).
24. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 123-124.
25. Id. at 124.
26. Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or Not an Obligation Exists
to Transmit the Information Called for under Article 73e of the Charter, G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), Principle
VI, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1541 (XV) (Dec. 15, 1960). This resolution served as the interpretative
counterpart to the 1960 Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960).
27. Principle VI of Resolution 1541 states, "A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have
reached a full measure of self-government by: (a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free
association with an independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State." G.A. Res. 1541,
supra note 26, at 29.
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territory of the State administering it." 28  The fact that paragraph 6 explicitly
confines its purpose to colonial peoples is significant for the fact that the other
paragraphs preceding it do not explicitly confine their purpose to colonial peoples.
This is further inferential evidence that the preceding paragraphs-1, 2, 4, and 5-
refer to peoples beyond the colonial context.
Paragraph 6 continues by noting "such separate and distinct status under the
Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory
have exercised their right of self-determination . . . .29 Crucially, paragraph 6
would seem to indicate that only one people can exist within a non-self-governing
territory, as the plural "peoples" is not employed. 30 This drafting is inconsistent
with Articles 73, 73(b), and 76(b) of the U.N. Charter, all of which indicate that
more than one people may inhabit a non-self-governing territory. 31 It is also
inconsistent with Principles 2, 7(a), 8, and 9 of Resolution 1541, all of which
32suggest that more than one people can inhabit a non-self-governing territory. On
balance, therefore, the failure of paragraph 6 to use the plural term "peoples"
probably constitutes a drafting error.
Principle 5, paragraph 7 of Resolution 2625 arguably moves beyond the
colonial context when employing the term "peoples":
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described
above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or
colour.33
Paragraph 7 hence links its content to "sovereign and independent States," which
would, on balance, seem to refer to "States"-not non-self-governing territories.
Although it may be argued that metropolitan powers34 are "States" responsible for
non-self-governing territories, this does not seem to be the primary objective of
paragraph 7. This reasoning is not negated by the subsequent phrase: "States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above," which necessarily requires that all
28. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Paragraph 6 is consistent only with Principle VII(b) of Resolution 1541, which states, "The
associated territory should have the right to determine its internal constitution without outside
interference, in accordance with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the
people. This does not preclude consultations as appropriate or necessary under the terms of the free
association agreed upon." G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 26, at 29-30.
32. Id. at 29-30.
33. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
34. A "metropolitan" power is a state which has responsibility for a non-self-governing territory
as enumerated in Principles V and VI of Resolution 1541. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 26, at 29.
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other paragraphs before paragraph 7 must be considered-as paragraphs 1, 2, 4,
and 5 indicate-that peoples may exist in a colonial and non-colonial context.
Only paragraph 6 restricts its discussion of peoples to the non-self-governing or
colonial context. It would thus seem highly probable that paragraph 7 is
addressing its comments to sovereign states, which by implication confirms the
applicability of the term "peoples" to the non-colonial context.
Paragraph 7 does, however, contain some drafting problems. This is because
although it applies the term "peoples" to the non-colonial context, taken literally, it
suggests that only one people may constitute a sovereign state. This is revealed by
the phrase "thus possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory . . . ."35 If it is accepted that "peoples" may refer to
national groups within non-self-governing territories and states, as indicated by
Articles 73, 73(b), and 76(b) of the U.N. Charter and Principles 2, 7(a), 8, and 9 of
Resolution 1541, it would seem that the drafting of paragraph 7 is incorrect. This
is because the phrase "whole people belonging to the territory" suggests that there
may only be one people within a state. Moreover the phrase "without distinction
as to race, creed or colour," which proceeds the phrase "whole people belonging to
the territory," suggests that states are not monolithic units and comprise sub-state
groups.36 Paragraph 7 should perhaps have used the phrase "thus possessed of a
government representing all peoples belonging to the territory without distinction
as to race, creed or colour." This use of the plural "peoples" would bring
paragraph 7 unambiguously into line with other prior U.N. instruments, including
the U.N. Charter, which the Friendly Relations Declaration was drafted to be in
accordance with, as indicated by the latter's extended title-Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations.
35. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124 (emphasis added). Pentassuglia states that "[a] narrow
reading of the clause [at page 124] is suggested by the 'whole people' formula: it is precisely the whole
people, not individual groups comprising it, to be entitled to react to oppressive regimes." Gaetano
Pentassuglia, State Sovereignty, Minorities and Self-Determination: A Comprehensive Legal View, 9
INT'L J. MINORITY & GRP. RTS. 303, 311 (2002); loms argues that "even though the whole people may
have a right of self-determination under the Declaration, a part of that whole may not have any separate
right." Catherine J. lorns, Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty,
24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 199, 260 (1992). Thonberry has argued that "the point is that 'whole'
territories or peoples are the focus of rights, rather than ethnic groups . . . ." Patrick Thornberry, Self-
Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments, 38 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 867, 877 (1989).
36. Radan, for example, has noted that "[tihis 'without distinction' provision implies the existence
of different groups as parts of a state's entire population. If there was no recognition that such groups
could exist within a state, the 'without distinction' provision would be superfluous." RADAN, supra note
1, at 60. Duursma has similarly noted "'[t]he whole people' of paragraph 7 of the Declaration means
either that one State can have but one people, or that within a State more than one people can coexist.
The latter meaning seems correct if we read it in combination with the prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of race, creed or colour." JORRI DUURSMA, FRAGMENTATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS OF MICRO-STATES 25 (James Crawford et al. eds., 1996).
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B. A Right ofPeoples to UNC Secession?
Principle 5, paragraph I specifies "[b]y virtue of the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples . . .all peoples have the right freely to determine
. . . their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development . . ." Paragraph I thus makes clear that self-determination applies to"all peoples," which has been determined in the previous section to include
colonial and non-colonial peoples.37  Paragraph 1 also reveals that self-
determination is a right, declaring, "every State has the duty to respect this right."38
The use of the words "duty" and "right" strongly suggests that there are remedies
for the breach of such a right.39  However, examined in isolation, paragraph 1
provides little insight as to whether potential remedies might include UNC
secession.
Principle 5, paragraph 2 affirms the applicability of the right of peoples to
self-determination in cases of colonialism and situations of "alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation."4 0  Although the phrase "alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation" includes colonial situations, it also captures non-
colonial situations. Beyond this finding, however, paragraph 2 fails to yield
further information.
Principle 5, paragraph 4 enumerates the ways in which a people might pursue
their external self-determination, namely, the establishment of "a sovereign and
independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or
the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people." 41 As
observed in the previous section, paragraph 4, although based upon the text of
Resolution 1541, does not restrict its application specifically to non-self-governing
peoples. In other words, paragraph 4 is deliberately unspecific as to which types of
peoples its content applies. This generates the conclusion that one of the modes of
external self-determination-the establishment of "a sovereign and independent
State"-may apply to colonial and non-colonial peoples, with the latter by
necessity opening the possibility of UNC secession.
Principle 5, paragraph 5 deals with the duty of states "to refrain from any
forcible action which deprives peoples . .. of their right to self-determination and
freedom and independence." 42  Paragraph 5-like paragraph 4-is deliberately
unspecific as to the types of peoples its content is applicable to, with the logical
corollary that it likely applies to colonial and non-colonial peoples. It follows that
where a breach of internal self-determination has occurred, the afflicted people
37. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 123.
3 8. Id.
39. Here the Latin maxim ubi jus ibi remedium (there cannot be a right without a remedy) is
relevant. See generally Olga ukovid, Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples, in
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION 323,
331-332 (Milan ahovid ed., 1972).
40. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
4 1. Id.
42. Id.
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should not be forcibly deprived of their right to remedy this situation by the pursuit
of external self-determination, as indicated by the words "freedom and
independence." By implication, therefore, paragraph 5 would seem to endorse
unilateral colonial ("UC") and UNC secession.43
Principle 5, paragraph 7 provides the clearest grounds for UNC secession,
with an a contrario reading indicating that only those "States conducting
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples . . . and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour"44 will be
guaranteed their "territorial integrity or political unity."45 Paragraph 7 thus
stipulates that if a state does not represent the whole population, or discriminates
on the grounds of "race, creed or colour," 46 it is in violation of the right to self-
determination and therefore illegitimate. 7 In order to rectify this situation,
secessionist activities that would "dismember or impair, totally or in part the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States" appear
to be implicitly endorsed.48 A priori, paragraph 7 contains a right to UNC
secession.
This right is a qualified one, however, with paragraph 7 stipulating that non-
colonial peoples may only "dismember or impair, totally or in part the territorial
integrity and political unity of sovereign States" when they are subjected to
discrimination on the grounds of "race, creed or colour." 49  This prompts the
question: what exactly do the latter three terms mean? As the Declaration's
travaux prdparatoires and procks verbaux provide little or no guidance, it has been
left to eminent scholars to formulate their own definitions.
Cassese has provided one of the best known analyses. He argues that the
terms "race" and "colour" express an identical concept-race-and represent a
43. The implications of this paragraph for unilateral non-colonial secession are, with perhaps the
exception of Castellino's circumspect comments, universally unacknowledged by scholars who instead
prefer to focus on the more textually obvious paragraph 7 of principle 5. See JOSHUA CASTELLINO,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE INTERPLAY OF THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL
POSSESSION WITH FORMULATIONS OF POST-COLONIAL 'NATIONAL' IDENTITY 39-40 (2000).
44. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
45. Id.
46. Id. Such behaviour would likely offend Articles 2, 14, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, and 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Articles 2, 7(a)(i), possibly 13(1) and 15(1)(a)
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights arts. 2, 14, 17-18, 24-27, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights arts. 2, 7(a)(i), 13(1), 15(l)(a), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
47. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
48. W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Self-Determination, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 349, 362-63
(Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995); RADAN, supra note 1, at 52-53; LEE C.
BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 92-93 (1978); Rosenstock, supra
note 15, at 732; M. Rafiqul Islam, Secession Crisis in Papua New Guinea: The Proclaimed Republic of
Bougainville in International Law, 13 U. HAW. L. REV. 453, 456-61 (1991); Jordan J. Paust, Self-
Determination: A Definitional Focus, in SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS 3, 7 (Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander eds., 1980).
49. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
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pleonasm originating from Article 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human
Rights.o Cassese strictly construes "race" as only connoting physical somatic
differences, explicitly rejecting any definition that encompasses factors such as
language or culture.5 1  He further postulates that the meaning of "creed" is
restricted to "religious beliefs,,5 2 rather than the broader definition provided by the
Oxford English Dictionary: "a set of opinions on any subject."5 3 Cassese arrives at
this conclusion by arguing that if "creed" encompassed the broader Oxford
definition, "a set of opinions on any subject," a government not representing the
opinions of a people, even if democratically elected, could be interpreted as
violating that people's right to self-determination. 54 He therefore concludes that
the right to UNC secession contained in paragraph 7 is activated only on the
grounds of racial or religious discrimination against a people.5 5
Cassese's first point-that the terms "race" and "colour" represent a
pleonasm-is convincing for the following reason: it is difficult, if not impossible,
to imagine a situation where two or more peoples may be of a different colour,
whilst at the same time not also constituting a different race.
Less convincing, however, is Cassese's narrow definition of "race," which is
confined to physical somatic differences. As Radan points out, prior to the
adoption of the Friendly Relations Declaration in 1970, the words "race" and
"nation"-the latter of which incorporates sociological elements, such as language
and culture-were often used interchangeably.5 6  To illustrate this point, Radan
quotes Hobsbawm:
[W]hat brought 'race' and 'nation' even closer was the practice of using
both as virtual synonyms, generalizing equally widely about
'racial'/'national' character, as was then the fashion. Thus before the
Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904, a French writer observed,
agreement between the two countries had been dismissed as impossible
because of the 'hereditary enmity' between the two races.5 7
50. Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human rights provides that "[e]veryone is entitled to
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or
international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent,
trust, non-self-goveming or under any other limitation of sovereignty." Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). See CASSESE, supra
note 12, at 112.
51. CASSESE, supra note 12, at 112.
52. Id.
53. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1157 (2d ed. 1933).
54. CASSESE, supra note 12, at 112-13.
55. Cassese does not use the word "people" in his analysis of the terms "race, creed or colour."
Although, as Radan asserts, "it is hard to see how [Cassese] could deny [that a group is a people], given
that only peoples have the right to self-determination." RADAN, supra note 1, at 56 n.132.
56. Id. at 58.
57. Id. (quoting ERIC J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME,
MYTH, REALIrY 108-09 (1990)). Brownlie also agrees with this interpretation, asserting "[tihe concept
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This same tendency is also prevalent in the U.N. Charter's travaux
prdparatoires, which demonstrate that on numerous occasions the word "race" was
used interchangeably with "peoples." 8 In the Summary Report of the Sixth
Meeting of Committee 11/4 of 17 May 1945, for example, a sentence appeared
stating:
[n]othing in the Charter should contravene the principle of the equality
of all races; and their right to self-determination, whether it resulted in
independence or not, should be recognized.
The synonymy between "races" and "peoples" evident above is important, as the
Charter's travaux also reveals that the word "peoples" captures the concept of
"nations." 60 Adding further weight to the argument for an expansive interpretation
of the word "race" is the definition provided by the Oxford English Dictionary: "a
tribe, nation or people, regarded as of common stock."6'
Further evidence of the synonymy between "races" and "nations" is provided
by the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Article 1 of which contains the most widely accepted definition of
"racial discrimination" stating:
[i]n this convention, the term 'racial discrimination' shall mean any
distinction, exclusion or restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin.62
It follows that the notion of racial discrimination encompasses distinction or
exclusion based upon and related to "national or ethnic origin." It may be
reasonably inferred then that the term "race" not only connotes physical somatic
differences, but also other factors associated with nationality and ethnicity, such as
language, culture and customs. Although proponents of a restrictive interpretation
of "race" may argue that the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination does not constitute text of the Friendly Relations
Declaration, it could hardly be suggested that the most important international
of [a people's] distinct character depends on a number of criteria which may appear in combination.
Race (or nationality) is one of the more important of the relevant criteria, but the concept of race can
only be expressed scientifically in terms of more specific features, in which matters of culture,
language, religion and group psychology predominate." Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern
International Law, 9 BULL. AUSTL. Soc'Y LEGAL PHIL. 104, 108 (1985).
58. RADAN, supra note 1, at 58. See also, e.g., United Nations Conference on International
Organization, S.F., Cali., Apr. 25-June 26, 1945, Belgian Delegation Amendment to Paragraph 2 of
Chapter 1, 1 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.374/17 (Vol. 6) (May 17, 1945); United Nations Conference on
International Organization, S.F., Cali., Apr. 25-June 26, 1945, New Uruguayan Proposals on
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2 (Vol. 3) (May 5, 1945).
59. United Nations Conference on International Organization, 1945, Summary Report of the Sixth
Meeting of Committee 11/4, 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.404/17 (Vol. 10) (May 17, 1945).
60. RADAN, supra note 1, at 58-59.
61. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 87 (8th ed. 1933).
62. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 1, 1 1,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3940.html.
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document expounding on matters of racial discrimination should be ignored, or
63even worse, contradicted, when construing paragraph 7.
Thus, to confine the meaning of "race" purely to physical somatic differences,
as Cassese advocates, is unjustified. The term "race" should also be read as
connoting other factors associated with nations, such as language, culture, and
customs. It is entirely conceivable therefore, that linguistic, cultural, and
customary discrimination could be covered by paragraph 7. 4 A priori, peoples
subjected to linguistic, cultural, or customary discrimination within sovereign
states could be entitled to UNC secession.
Cassese's interpretation of "creed"-confined only to religious groups-is
more convincing. As noted above, if the broad definition of creed were to be
accepted-"a set of opinions on any subject"-a government not specifically
representing the opinions of a people, even if democratically elected, could be
interpreted as violating that people's right to self-determination. This in turn
would open the possibility for unlimited UNC secession, having chaotic and
destabilizing implications for international politics-hardly the intention of
drafters. "Creed" should thus be understood as only endorsing UNC secession
where a people experience religious discrimination.65
To recapitulate, paragraph 7 only guarantees the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of states conducting themselves "in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole population belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour."66 The words "race," "creed," and "colour"
clearly encompass racial, linguistic, cultural, customary, and religious
discrimination. A priori, a prima facie right to UNC secession exists in cases of
racial, linguistic, cultural, customary, and religious discrimination. Paragraph 7
therefore has a wide operational ambit and is not confined merely to racially
discriminatory regimes.67
63. This fact is further reinforced by the case of Iran v. United States, where the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal indicated that Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT")
allows analysis of other legal documents in the relevant subject area when construing an instrument's
parameters. Iran v. United States, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251 (1984). Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT
provides that when construing the meaning of an instrument, "any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties" may be utilized. Id.; see also MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 935 (6th ed. 2008).
64. This is a finding explicitly ruled out by Cassese, who argues "the right of internal self-
determination embodied in the 1970 declaration is a right conferred only on racial or religious groups
living in a sovereign State which are denied access to the political decision making process; linguistic
or national groups do not have a concomitant right." CASSESE, supra note 12, at 114 (emphasis in
original).
65. This is supported by a holistic examination of "creed" within the Oxford English Dictionary,
which suggests that the primary meaning of the term is confined to religious belief. See OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 53, at 1157. Paragraph 7 ought to have, therefore, used the word
"religion" rather than "creed" to avoid confusion and ambiguity.
66. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
67. The primary example of such a regime would be apartheid South Africa.
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It should be noted, however, that although paragraph 7 explicitly qualifies the
right to UNC secession to discrimination based on "race, creed or colour," four
further implicit qualifying conditions are also likely attached. First, as Cassese has
correctly observed, the right will only be exercisable where the discrimination is of
a deliberate, sustained, and systematic nature, with "the exclusion of any likelihood
,68for a possible peaceful solution within the existing state structure." Thus,
isolated instances of discrimination, or unwitting application of discriminatory
principles by a government against a people, will not automatically invoke a right
to UNC secession. An additional level of dolus, or intentional malice, such as
flagrant disregard for fundamental human rights, is necessary. These requirements
operate as a general "threshold test" for the operation of paragraph 7 rights,
ensuring that UNC secession is only permitted under especially egregious
conditions.
A second and related qualifying condition arguably implicit in paragraph 7-
although almost universally unacknowledged by scholars-is that the deliberate,
sustained, and systematic discrimination must possess sufficient
contemporaneousness. In other words, there must be a sufficient temporal nexus
between the alleged discrimination and the resultant claim for UNC secession.
Without this requirement, UNC secession would be permitted based on human
rights abuses that might have occurred hundreds of years earlier.6 9  The precise
time necessary for the expiration of a right to UNC secession is obviously
debatable, although it is submitted here that a minimum time of ten to fifteen years
from the cessation of abuses would be required. Certainly, a short time period,
such as five years, should not jeopardize a valid claim. 70
A third qualifying condition arguably implicit in paragraph 7 is that any state
established by UNC secession must ensure that the human rights of minorities-
especially those minority groups that were previously part of the oppressive
majority-are protected, preferably by way of constitutional structures. This
condition, which might for convenience be termed the "internal consistency
68. CASSESE, supra note 12, at 120. For similar comments, see Dietrich Murswiek, The Issue ofa
Right to Secession - Reconsidered, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 21, 26 (Christian
Tomuschat ed., 1993); Katherine Doehring, Self-Determination, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 56, 66 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994); Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Spirit and Letter
of the Right to Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples: Reflections on the Making of the United
Nations Draft Declaration, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-
DETERMINATION 67, 76 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000).
69. Goodwin has remarked, "[t]he integration of Mercia into the emerging English nation at the
point of the sword of the King of Wessex was probably no laughing matter, even by 10th century
standards; could it be used as a basis for a claim to secede from its southern neighbours?" Morag
Goodwin, From Province to Protectorate to State? Speculation on the Impact of Kosovo's Genesis
upon the Doctrines ofInternational Law, 8 GERMAN L. J. 1, 6 (2007), available at http://www.germanla
wjoumal.com/index.php?pagelD=11&artllD786. See also G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
70. Goodwin, although pondering the length of time necessary for the expiration of a qualified
right to unilateral non-colonial secession, does not suggest an answer. Goodwin, supra note 69, at 6-7.
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principle," would ensure that the law of self-determination cannot, under any
circumstances, be utilized to foster or perpetuate human rights violations.7
Finally, any UNC secession pursuant to paragraph 7 would be required to
comply with the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territorial claim, a government, capacity to enter relations
with other states and independence. 72 It would also have to fulfil the criteria for
statehood based on compliance with peremptory norms, in particular, the
prohibition of the illegal use of force. Failure to satisfy one or more of these
conditions, with the possible exception of effective government,74 would obviously
be fatal to any UNC secession attempt, preventing the attainment of statehood and
precluding existing states from granting critically important recognition.75
71. The internal consistency principle is arguably implicit in General Assembly Resolution
54/183, which prohibits "ethnically based division" and "cantonization" in Kosovo, and hence
discrimination by the majority ethnic group (ethnic Albanians) against other minorities. G.A. Res.
54/183, 7, U.N. Doc. AIRES/54/183 (Feb. 29, 2000). The principle may also be considered as
informing the European Community's Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, promulgated in
late 1991 in response to political events in Europe. The Guidelines enumerate that European
Community member states will "adopt a common position on the process of recognition of ... new
States, which requires," inter alia, "guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and
minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE." Danilo
Turk, Recognition of States: A Comment, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 6, 72 (1993). In a purely philosophical
context, an alternative approach to the protection of newly created minorities has been mooted by
Hannum, namely, that they should "enjoy the same right of secession or self-determination that was
asserted by the seceding population." Although philosophically appealing, it is submitted here that it is
probably going too far to read such a condition into paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration.
Hurst Hannum, A Principled Response to Ethnic Self-Determination Claims, in JUSTICE PENDING:
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND OTHER GOOD CAUSES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ERICA-IRENE A. DAES 263,
271 (Gudmundur Alfredsson and Maria Stavropoulou eds., 2002). See also Hurst Hannum, The Specter
of Secession: Responding to Claims for Ethnic Self-Determination, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at
17, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/53801/hurst-hannum/the-specter-of-secession-
responding-to-claims-for-ethnic-self-de.
72. RADAN, supra note 1, at 21, 245; Garth Nettheim, 'Peoples'and Populations' - Indigenous
Peoples and the Rights of Peoples, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 105, 120 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
On the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness generally, see, for example, IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 70-72 (7th ed. 2008); CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 45-46;
JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 7 (1987); Thomas D. Grant, Defining
Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 413-14
(1999).
73. On the criteria for statehood based on compliance with peremptory norms generally, see, for
example, Crawford, supra' note 72, at 107; DUURSMA, supra note 36, at 127-28; DAVID RAkl,
STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 156, 167 (2002).
74. Regarding the "compensatory force principle," see RAIC, supra note 73, at 104, 364.
75. See RADAN, supra note 1, at 245; Lawrence M. Frankel, International Law of Secession: New
Rules for a New Era, 14 Hous. J. INT'L L. 521, 550 (1992); Holly A. Osterland, National Self-
Determination and Secession: The Slovak Model, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 655, 676-78 (1993); Ved
P. Nanda, The New Dynamics of Self-Determination: Revisiting Self-Determination as an International
Law Concept: A Major Challenge in the Post-Cold War Era, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 443, 446
(1997). Lloyd argues the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness played an important role in the
recognition of the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics. David 0. Lloyd, Succession, Secession and
State Membership in the United Nations, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 761, 792-94 (1994).
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The view that UNC secession may be permitted in the event of deliberate,
sustained and systematic discrimination, although clearly antithetical to a state-
centric international legal order, is not entirely without precedent. Paragraph 7
does, for example, draw a modicum of support from comments made by the
Commission of Jurists and the Commission of Rapporteurs in the 1920 Aaland
Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden. The dispute arose with the collapse
of the Russian provisional government in October 1917, when Finland-that
included the Aaland Islands-asserted its independence and the islands' Swedish
inhabitants simultaneously sought reunification with Sweden, appealing to the
right of peoples to self-determination. The Commission of Jurists observed,
"Positive international law does not recognise the right of national groups, as such,
to separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple
expression of a wish, any more than it recognises the right of other States to claim
such separation."7 7
Significantly, this finding was followed by a statement that the Commission:
does not give an opinion concerning the question as to whether a
manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power, to the detriment of a
section of the population of a State, would, if such circumstances arose,
give to an international dispute, arising therefrom, such an international
character that its object should be considered as one which is not
confined to the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned.
The above quotation clearly indicates that domestic disputes between segments of
a state's population may assume an international character in the event of
"manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power."79 It follows that if a segment
of a state's population were subjected to deliberate, sustained and systematic
discrimination, with no prospect for domestic resolution, a right to UNC secession
might arise.
The Commission of Rapporteurs also denied the existence of an unqualified
right to UNC secession, stating:
[i]s it possible to admit as an absolute rule that a minority of the
population of a State, which is definitely constituted and perfectly
capable of fulfilling its duties as such, has the right of separating itself
76. See JAMES BARROS, THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION: ITS SETTLEMENT BY THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS 60-65 (1968); MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 33; Philip Marshall Brown, The Aaland Islands
Question, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 268-69 (1921); Charles Noble Gregory, The Neutralization of the
Aaland Islands, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 64 (1923); Tore Modeen, V6lkerrechtliche Probleme der Aland-
Inseln, 37 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 604, 604 (1977), available at http://www.zaoerv.de/37_1977/37_197
7 3 4 a 604_619.pdf; Tore Modeen, Aaland Islands, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1, 1-3 (12th ed. 1992); Norman J. Padelford and K. Gosta A. Andersson, The Aaland Islands
Question, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 465, 469 (1939).
77. Report of the Int'l Comm. ofJurists Entrusted by the Council of the League ofNations with the
Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League of
Nations Doc. C.20/4/238 1920 VII (1920).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id.
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from her in order to be incorporated in another State or to declare its
independence? The answer can only be in the negative. To concede to
minorities, either of language or religion or to any fractions of a
population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they
belong, because it is their wish or good pleasure, would be to destroy
order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in
international life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the
very idea of the State as a territorial and political unity.80
However, like the Commission of Jurists, the Rapporteurs did not completely
rule out UNC secession:
The separation of a minority from the State of which it forms part and
its incorporation in another State can only be considered as an
exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or
the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees [of linguistic,
religious and social freedom].8 '
UNC secession therefore appears to be implicitly endorsed when a "State
lacks either the will or power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees" of
linguistic, religious, and social freedom for a segment of its population.82 In this
sense, both Commissions' comments resemble-albeit circumspectly-the content
of paragraph 7, namely, that state sovereignty and territorial integrity is only
guaranteed in the absence of deliberate, sustained, and systematic discrimination,
and that should such abuses occur, UNC secession constitutes a legitimate ultimum
remedium.83
It might also be argued that the law of decolonization provides further implicit
support for a qualified right to UNC secession. It is undeniable, for example, that
post-1945, the colonization of peoples by imperial powers was regarded as
undesirable. Preambular paragraph I of the 1960 declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 84 ("Colonial Declaration")
describes colonialism as an impediment to "social progress and better standards of
life in larger freedom."85 Preambular paragraph 7 similarly asserts that colonialism
"prevents the development of international economic co-operation, [and] impedes
the social, cultural and economic development of dependent peoples."86 Finally,
preambular paragraph 9 portrays colonialism as tantamount to institutionalized
80. Report Presented to the Council of the League by the Comm. of Rapporteurs, at 28, League of
Nations Council Document B7.21/68/106 (1921).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Many commentators overlook or obscure these aspects of the Aaland Islands reports. See, e.g.,
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF
CONFLICTING RIGHTS 29 n.86 (1990); Lawrence S. Eastwood Jr., Secession: State Practice and
International Law After the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 299, 302 (1993).
84. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 26, 11.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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segregation and discrimination. The foregoing collectively imply that
colonialism is inherently unjust, whether examined from an economic, social, or
cultural perspective. In order to remedy this injustice, instruments such as the
Colonial Declaration, Resolution 1541, and the Friendly Relations Declaration
declare that prima facie, complete independence should be granted to the peoples
so affected. The law of decolonization therefore functions in a remedial manner,
attempting to eliminate situations of economic, social, and cultural oppression. In
this sense then, the import of Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration operates as a logical extension of the decolonization doctrine.
Accordingly, the notion that territorial integrity and state sovereignty might be
violable under certain strict conditions does not appear entirely anomalous.89
Finally, Principle 5, paragraph 8 declares "[e]very State shall refrain from any
action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial
integrity of any other State or country." 90 The opening words of the paragraph-
"[e]very State"-suggest that the content of the paragraph applies only to states-
not peoples. This is hardly surprising, given that the entire Declaration is directed
at friendly relations and cooperation among states.91 Thus, paragraph 8 does not in
any way prejudice the qualified right to UNC secession contained in paragraph 7,
which is exercisable by peoples. 92
The Friendly Relations Declaration therefore allows self-determination to
predominate over state sovereignty and territorial integrity in the event of
deliberate, sustained, and systematic discrimination against peoples. By doing so,
the Declaration draws a link between internal self-determination and external self-
determination: the neglect of the former provides justification for the invoking of
the latter, which may be exercised by UNC secession. 93  This is a seminal
development, challenging-albeit modestly-the incontrovertibility of state
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
87. Id.
88. The other options posited by such instruments include free association with an independent
state and integration with an existing state. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
89. Indeed some scholars, such as Franck and Crawford, have propounded the doctrine of
"internal colonization," which potentially allows peoples within states to unilaterally secede. See Tom
Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in THEMES AND THEORIES: SELECTED
ESSAYS, SPEECHES, AND WRITINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 828, 830 (Rosalyn Higgins ed., 2009);
James Crawford, Outside the Colonial Context, in SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH 1,
13-14 (W.J. MacArtney ed., 1988).
90. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
91. The Declaration's preamble also makes this point: "[r]eaffirming, in accordance with the
Charter, the basic importance of sovereign equality and stressing that the purposes of the United
Nations can be implemented only if states enjoy sovereign equality and comply fully with the
requirements of this principle in their international relations." Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
92. See RADAN, supra note 1, at 56; MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 76; Robin C.A. White, Self-
Determination: Time for a Reassessment?, 28 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 147, 159 (198 1).
93. See CASSESE, supra note 12, at 120; Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees ofSelf-Determination
in the United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304,305-06 (1994).
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In addition to Cassese 94 and Radan, 95 numerous other scholars have broadly
concurred with the foregoing analysis. 96 The significance of paragraph 7 was also
noted by the International Commission of Jurists in its 1972 study, The Events in
East Pakistan 1971.97 After stating that paragraph 7 gave primacy to the principle
of territorial integrity, the Commission further remarked:
[i]t is submitted, however, that this principle is subject to the
requirement that the government does comply with the principle of
equal rights and does represent the whole people without distinction. If
one of the constituent peoples of a state is denied equal rights and is
discriminated against, it is submitted that their full right to self-
determination will revive.9 8
94. CASSESE, supra note 12, at 119-20 ("Although secession is implicitly authorized by the
Declaration, it must however be strictly construed, as with all exceptions. It can therefore be suggested
that the following conditions might warrant secession: when the central authorities of a sovereign State
persistently refuse to grant participatory rights to a religious or racial group, grossly and systematically
trample upon their fundamental rights, and deny the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement within
the framework of the State structure. Thus a denial of the basic right of representation does not give rise
per se to the right of secession. In addition, there must be gross breaches of fundamental human rights,
and, what is more, the exclusion of any likelihood for a peaceful resolution within the existing State
structure.").
95. RADAN, supra note 1, at 52 ("The very essence of paragraph 7 is that a state's territorial
integrity is assured only under certain conditions. These conditions require a state to conduct itself in
such a way that certain groups within the state are not subjected to particular discrimination. If groups
are subjected to discrimination they are entitled to secede.").
96. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 48, at 92; CASSESE, supra note 12, at 118-20; CRAWFORD, supra
note 1, at 119; C. Lloyd Brown-John, Self-Determination, Autonomy and State Secession in Federal
Constitutional and International Law, 40 S. TEX. L. REv. 567, 588 (1999). See also James Crawford,
Right of Self-Determination in International Law, in PEOPLES' RIGHTS 57 (Philip Alston ed., 2001);
HtCTOR GROS ESPIELL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS 10 (1980); Neil Finkelstein, George Vegh & Camille Joy, Does Quebec have a Right to
Secede at International Law?, 74 CAN. B. REV. 225, 260 (1995); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination
Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 269-70
(1981); Paust, supra note 48, at 7; M. K. Nawaz, Bangladesh and International Law, 11 INDIAN J. INT'L
L. 251, 256 (1971); Islam, supra note 48, at 458; Don Johnson, Toward Self-determination-A
Reappraisal as Reflected in the Declaration on Friendly Relations, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.145, 153
(1973); Otto Kimmich, A 'Federal' Right of Self-Determination?, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 91 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); Kirgis, supra note 93, at 308; P. H. Kooijmans,
Tolerance, Sovereignty and Self-Determination, 42 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. R. 211, 216 (1996); Roman
Krys, The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, 63 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE SCIENCES
ET POLITIQUES 289, 297 (1985); H6ctor Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation
of United Nations Resolutions, at 10, U.N. Doc. AIE/CN.4/Sub.2/405 (June 20, 1980); Jimdnez de
Ardchaga, International Law in the Past Third ofa Century, in RECUEIL DES COURS 110 (1978); Robert
McCorquodale, Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Context, 4 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 598, 603-
604 (1992); Murswiek, supra note 68, at 27; MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 76; Raid, supra note 73, at
323; M. G. Kaladharan Nayar, Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Context: Biafra in Retrospect,
10 TEX. INT'L L. J. 321, 337 (1975).
97. The Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan, 1971:
A Legal Study (1972), available at http://nsm I.nsm.iup.edu/sanwar/Bangladesh%2OGenocide.htm.
98. Id. See also RADAN, supra note 1, at 61.
364 VOL. 41: 3
UNILATERAL NON-COLONIAL SECESSION
It follows that UJNC secession is permitted in circumstances where peoples are
subject to discrimination.
Commensurate comments regarding paragraph 7 were rendered by Judge
Yusuf in his Separate Opinion in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion:99
This provision [Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration] makes it clear that so long as a sovereign and independent
State complies with the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, its territorial integrity and national unity should neither be
impaired nor infringed upon. It therefore primarily protects, and gives
priority to, the territorial preservation of States and seeks to avoid their
fragmentation or disintegration due to separatist forces. However the
saving clause in its latter part implies that if a State fails to comport
itself in accordance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, an exceptional situation may arise whereby
the ethnically or racially distinct group denied internal self-
determination may claim a right of external self-determination or
separation from the State which could effectively put into question the
State's territorial unity and sovereignty. 00
Judge Yusuf thus interpreted paragraph 7 as making a linkage between the denial
of internal self-determination and the right of peoples to exercise external self-
determination by way of UNC secession. His comments thus represent a
qualification upon the traditional principles of state sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
There are some scholars, however, who deny that paragraph 7 endorses UNC
secession. Binder, for example, after reviewing paragraphs 1 and 7, has asserted,
"the Declaration recognized a right of secession not for peoples at all, but for those
territories that happened to be recognized by the United Nations as colonies."' 0
He later concludes "[b]eyond the decolonization context . . . the Declaration
completely absorbed the nationalist component of self-determination into the
sovereignty of existing states."l 02
These observations are manifestly incorrect. Paragraphs 1 and 7 do not restrict
the meaning of the word "peoples" only to colonial situations. On the contrary, as
pointed out above, paragraph I explicitly states that "all peoples" have the right to
99. Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, 112 (July 22) (separate opinion of Judge Yusuf).
100. Id. See also id. IN 182-84 (separate opinion of Judge Cangado Trindade). But see id. 1 21-25.
See generally Helen Quane, Self-Determination and Minority Protection After Kosovo, in KOsovo: A
PRECEDENT?: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ADVISORY OPINION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 181, 205-06 (James Summers ed., 2011);
John R. Alban, Signal and Affirm: How the United Nations Should Articulate the Right to Remedial
Secession, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 218-221 (2012); Evan G. Brewer, To Break Free from
Tyranny and Oppression: Proposing a Model for a Remedial Right to Secession in the Wake of the
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 245, 245 (2012).
101. Binder, supra note 13 (emphasis in original).
102. Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
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self-determination, a point previously affirmed by Article 2 of the Colonial
Declaration and common Article 1(1) of the International Covenants on Human
Rights. Furthermore, when Principle 5 does focus exclusively on colonial peoples,
as in paragraphs 2(b) and 6, this fact is explicitly made clear. It is also difficult to
understand how Binder could overlook the basic meaning of paragraph 7, namely,
that only those "States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour"' 03 are entitled to their "territorial integrity or
political unity."l 04 As indicated by italics, paragraph 7 refers to "States," not non-
self-governing territories. Clearly then a literal interpretation of the Declaration's
text cannot sustain Binder's "anti-secession" arguments.
Shaw has proffered a similar argument claiming:
[i]f the principle [of self-determination] exists as a legal one, and it is
believed that such is the case, the question arises then of its scope and
application. As noted above, U.N. formulations of the principle from
the 1960 Colonial Declaration to the 1970 Declaration on Principles of
International Law and the 1966 International Covenants on Human
Rights stress that it is the right of "all peoples." If this is so, then all
peoples would become thereby to some extent subjects of international
law as the direct repositories of international rights, and if the definition
of "peoples" used was the normal political-sociological one, a major re-
arrangement of international law principles would have been created. In
fact, that has not occurred and an international law concept of what
constitutes a people for these purposes has evolved, so that the "self' in
question must be determined within the accepted colonial territorial
framework. Attempts to broaden this have.not been successful and the
U.N. has always strenuously opposed any attempt at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country. 05
As the above quotation reveals, Shaw is subtly misrepresenting the claim made by
proponents of a qualified right to LNC secession, by omitting mention that such a
right is in fact qualified. By doing so, Shaw implicitly suggests that to allow such
a right would be tantamount to anarchy. This is an overstatement. Furthermore, as
with Binder, his claim that the meaning of "peoples" is confined to the colonial
context cannot be supported by a literal interpretation of the Friendly Relations
Declaration, especially paragraphs 1 and 7.
103. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124 (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. SHAw, supra note 63, at 256. See also Malcolm N. Shaw, Peoples, Territorialism and
Boundaries, 8 EURO. J. INT'L L. 478, 483 (1997); Malcolm N. Shaw, Self-Determination and the Use of
Force, in MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PATRICK
THORNBERRY 35, 40 (Nazila Ghanea & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2005).
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Nonetheless, the conclusions drawn by Shaw, Binder, and others o0 prompt
the questions: why did paragraph 7 fail to endorse explicitly a qualified right of
UNC secession? Why must the legitimacy of UNC secession be extracted by an a
contrario reading?10 7 The answer lies in the drafting of the Declaration itself,
which as the travaux prdparatoires reveals, was dominated by two diametrically
opposed positions: those states, which favoured the inclusion of a right to
unilateral secession, and those states that did not. The communist bloc, for
instance, argued that the right to self-determination included an inherent and
unqualified right to UNC secession.108 Many western and African states, however,
felt that self-determination did not include such a right, qualified or otherwise.
With the opposing viewpoints unable to agree, the representative for the
Netherlands suggested a compromise:
The real problem [is] whether the firm determination to safeguard the
concept of the territorial integrity of sovereign States should go so far as
to exclude under all circumstances the possibility of the existence or
emergence of the right to self-determination [that is the right of
secession] on the part of a given people within a given State. So long as
adequate provision was made against abuse, the Committee would not
serve the cause of justice by excluding the possibility that a people
within an existing or future State would possess sufficient individual
identity to exercise the right to self-determination. If, for example-in
the opinion of the world community-basic human rights and
fundamental freedoms which imposed obligations on all States,
106. CASTELLINO, supra note 43, at 40; Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War
World: A New Internal Focus?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 733, 740 (1995); Horowitz, supra note 13, at 63-
67; lorns, supra note 33, at 261; Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-
Determination with Some Remarks on Federalism, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 101,
118 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); Johan D. van der Vyver, The Right to Self-Determination and its
Enforcement, 10 ISLA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 421, 427 (2004). Other scholars also seem to deny the
secessionist implications of paragraph 7, but are less explicit in their reasoning. Hannum, for instance,
seems to believe that paragraph 7 does not provide a qualified right to secession. Interestingly though,
he argues (without mentioning the Friendly Relations Declaration), that international law should permit
secession in situations analogous to that enumerated by paragraph 7. See Hurst Hannum, The Right of
Self-Determination in the Twenty-First Century, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 773, 776-77 (1998).
Higgins, after mentioning paragraph 7, concludes that state sovereignty and territorial integrity prevails
over a right to secession. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
How WE USE IT! 121 (1994). Myall also seems to deny the significance of paragraph 7, stating "the
principle of national self-determination . . . cannot be invoked-at least not with any hope of securing
widespread support-by dissatisfied minorities within existing states." James Myall, Non-Intervention,
Self-Determination and the New World Order, 67 INT'L AFF. 421, 424 (1991).
107. Rosenstock has correctly observed that Principle 5 of the Friendly Relations Declaration
"contains some tortured phraseology." Rosenstock, supra note 15, at 733.
108. Unqualified in the sense that a people need only decide to secede by referendum. No
additional criteria, such as egregious human rights violations, or discrimination on the basis of "race
creed or colour," was stipulated. A joint draft of paragraph 1 by the Soviet Union, Romania, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia demonstrates this position: "[e]ach people has the right to determine freely their
political status, including the right to establish an independent national state." See BUCHHEIT, supra
note 48, at 91.
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irrespective of their sovereign will, were not being respected by a
certain State, vis-i-vis one of the people living within its territory,
would one in such an instance-whatever the human implications-
wish to prevent the people that was fundamentally discriminated against
from invoking its right to self-determination [and hence, that people's
right to secede?] 09
A qualified right to UNC secession-enlivened by the denial of "basic human
rights and fundamental freedoms"-thus became the solution to break the deadlock
between either extreme. In order to satisfy those states opposed to a right of UNC
secession, paragraph 7 was carefully worded to omit any explicit mention of such a
right, even though an a contrario reading reveals it was implicitly endorsed under
certain circumstances. The arguments proffered by scholars such as Eastwood that
"[t]here are no United Nations documents that expressly recognize a general right
of [UNC] secession stemming from the concept of self-determination" therefore
constitute a gross over-simplification." 0 As Rosenstock has correctly observed,
the fact that paragraph 7 requires an a contrario reading to reveal the legitimacy of
UNC secession "should not be misunderstood to limit the sweep and liberality of
the paragraph.""'
C. Conclusion-The Friendly Relations Declaration
Examination of the Friendly Relations Declaration reveals that the term
"peoples" is not necessarily synonymous with the entire population of a non-self-
governing territory or state and may include national groups within non-self-
governing territories and states. Principle 5, paragraph 7 provides a qualified right
to UNC secession in the event that a people experience deliberate, sustained and
systematic discrimination on the basis of "race, creed or colour" which includes
racial, linguistic, cultural, customary, and religious discrimination.
III. THE DECLARATION ON THE OCCASION OF THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS ("FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY DECLARATION")
In October 1995, the General Assembly adopted the Fiftieth Anniversary
Declaration,112 which repeated, mutatis mutandis, the text of Article 2 of the
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action." 3
109. RAit, supra note 73, at 320.
110. Eastwood, supra note 83, at 303.
111. Rosenstock, supra note 15, at 732.
112. G.A. Res. 50/6, supra note 8.
113. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action-a non-General Assembly instrument-
was adopted unanimously by the U.N. World Conference on Human Rights in June 1993. The Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, however, was subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly
in Resolution 48/121. G.A. Res. 48/121, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/121 (Dec. 20, 1993).
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A. The Meaning of "Peoples"
Although "peoples" is mentioned in the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration's
preamble, 1 4 the first significant application of the term occurs in Article 1, which
provides that the U.N. will, inter alia,
[c]ontinue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all peoples,
taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or
other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and recognize
the right of peoples to take legitimate action in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations to realize their inalienable right to self-
determination. This shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging
any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction of any kind.'15
Article 1 contains two sentences. The first sentence provides that "all peoples"
have the right to self-determination, which prima facie, indicates that "peoples" is
a term of broad and general applicability. This interpretation is confirmed by the
remainder of the first sentence, which recognizes the "particular situation of
peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign
occupation."' 16  The phrase "colonial . . . domination" is clearly referring to
colonial situations of the type targeted and defined in the Colonial Declaration and
accompanying Resolution 1541. The phrase "alien domination," although
including colonial situations, is necessarily broader, extending to the non-colonial
context where peoples are subjected to alien or foreign rule. The phrase "foreign
domination" most likely refers to situations of foreign occupation and exploitation,
and therefore also captures peoples in a colonial and non-colonial context. The
first sentence of Article 1 thus indicates that peoples may exist in a colonial and
non-colonial context. It fails, however, to indicate whether peoples are necessarily
synonymous with the entire population of a state or non-self-governing territory, or
may also include national groups within non-self-governing territories and states.
No explicit reference is made, for example, to the articulation of the "self-
determination of peoples" in any earlier U.N. instruments, such as the Friendly
Relations Declaration.
The second sentence of Article I reiterates, mutatis mutandis, Principle 5,
paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration, with an a contrario reading
revealing that only those "sovereign and independent States conducting themselves
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
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territory without distinction of any kind" will be guaranteed their "territorial
integrity or political unity.""'7  The second sentence of Article I thus links its
content to "sovereign and independent States"-not non-self-governing territories.
Although it might be argued that metropolitan powers are "states" responsible for
non-self-governing territories, this does not seem to be the overall objective of the
second sentence of Article 1.
As with Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration,
however, the second sentence of Article 1 of the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration
does contain some drafting irregularities. This is because if taken literally, it
indicates that only one people may constitute a sovereign state. This is revealed by
the phrase, "thus possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory.""' 8 The use of the singular "people" as opposed to the
plural "peoples" can most likely be attributed to the fact that the second sentence
of Article 1 was based on Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration. If, however, it is accepted that "peoples" may refer to national groups
within non-self-governing territories and states, as indicated by instruments
antedating the Friendly Relations Declaration, such as the U.N. Charter (Articles
73, 73(b), and 76(b)) and Resolution 1541 (Principles 2, 7(a), 8, and 9), it would
seem that the drafting of Article 1 is incorrect, as the phrase "whole people"
suggests there may only be one people within a state. Moreover, the phrase
"without distinction of any kind," which proceeds the phrase "whole people
belonging to the territory," suggests that states are not monolithic and comprise
sub-state groups."' 9 On balance, therefore, the phrase "whole people" most likely
represents a drafting oversight.
B. A Right ofPeoples to UNC Secession?
The first sentence of Article 1 provides that the U.N. will, inter alia,
"continue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all peoples." 20
Immediately, therefore, it is clear that Article 1 casts self-determination as a
"right," thereby strongly implying that there must be remedies for a breach of this
right.'2' It is uncertain from examination of the first sentence, however, whether
potential remedies include a right to UNC secession.
The second sentence of Article 1, however, does contain a right to UNC
secession, with an a contrario reading providing that only those "sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the equal rights and
self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a government representing the
117. Id.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. See DUURSMA, supra note 36, at 25; RADAN, supra note 1, at 60.
120. G.A. Res. 50/6, supra note 8, art. 1.
121. Here the Latin Maxim, ubi jus ibi remedium (there cannot be a right without a remedy), is
applicable.
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whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind" are
guaranteed their "territorial integrity or political unity."l 22
It will be recalled that this text is substantially identical to Principle 5,
paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration. There is one important
difference though: the phrase "without distinction as to race, creed or colour" has
been replaced by the broader expression "without distinction of any kind." Article
1 thus removes the ambiguity and interpretative tedium associated with the words
"race, creed or colour" confirming that any form of discrimination against a people
is unacceptable. Thus, although the right to UNC secession contained within
Article 1 is qualified, it is perhaps slightly less qualified than the comparable right
contained in Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration. In any
event, Article I would seem to capture racial, linguistic, cultural, customary,
religious, or other forms of discrimination along ethnic or national lines. This
would of course capture a broad spectrum of human rights abuses, whether in
moderato (political, cultural and racial discrimination) or in extremis (ethnic
cleansing, mass killings and genocide).
As with the Friendly Relations Declaration, however, Article 1 arguably
contains four implicit qualifying conditions. First, the right to UNC secession will
only be exercisable where the discrimination is of a deliberate, sustained, and
systematic nature with "the exclusion of any likelihood for a possible peaceful
solution within the existing state structure."1 23  Thus, isolated instances of
discrimination or unwitting application of discriminatory principles by a
government against a sub-state group will not automatically invoke a right to UNC
secession by the group affected. Second, the discrimination in question would
have to possess sufficient contemporaneousness. Third, the internal consistency
principle would mandate constitutional protections for newly created minorities.
Finally, the UNC secession effectuated would have to comply with the criteria for
statehood based on effectiveness and compliance with peremptory norms.
C. Conclusion-The Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration
Examination of the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration reveals that the term
"peoples" is not necessarily synonymous with the entire population of a non-self-
governing territory or state and may include national groups within non-self-
governing territories and states. Furthermore, the Declaration provides a qualified
right to UNC secession for sub-state national groups subject to deliberate,
sustained and systematic discrimination "of any kind."
IV. SUMMATION OF DECLARATORY GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS
The instruments examined above indicate, on balance, that the term "peoples"
is not necessarily synonymous with the entire population of non-self-governing
122. G.A. Res. 50/6, supra note 8, art. 1.
123. CASSESE, supra note 12, at 120. See also Doehring, supra note 68, at 66; Murswiek, supra
note 68, at 26.
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territory or state and may include national groups within non-self-governing
territories and states. Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration and Article 1 of the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration provide a right to
UNC secession. This right is a qualified one and will only be enlivened where
non-colonial peoples are subject to deliberate, sustained, and systematic
discrimination "of any kind."1 24 This formulation captures a broad spectrum of
human rights abuses, whether in moderato (political, cultural and racial
discrimination) or in extremis (ethnic cleansing, mass killings and genocide).
A. Legal Effect of Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions
An investigation of the legal effects of declaratory General Assembly
resolutions facilitates an understanding of the precise impact of the qualified right
to UNC secession contained in Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration and Article 1 of the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration.125 The legal
potency of declaratory General Assembly resolutions has been the subject of
considerable scholarly debate. One school of thought, sometimes referred to as the
"traditional" school, denies that declaratory General Assembly resolutions have
legal effect. 126  The other school, sometimes referred to as the "progressive"
school, argues that such resolutions do have legal significance.1 27 Although the
General Assembly is not a legislature, it is nonetheless submitted here that there
are four possible ways declaratory resolutions influence the law-making process:
as authentic interpretations of the U.N. Charter, as evidence of state practice
(customary law formation), as general principles of international law, and by
indicating international consensus. 128  With the exception of consensus, these
124. Although the Friendly Relations Declaration used the phrase "race, creed or colour" this has
arguably been replaced by the broader expression "discrimination of any kind" and is therefore used
here for summative purposes. See G.A. Res. 50/6, supra note 8, art. 1..
125. Surprisingly almost every scholarly analysis of a right to UNC secession in declaratory
General Assembly resolutions fails to examine this issue. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination
and Secession Under International Law, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305, 309-11, 314-15 (2001).
126. See, e.g., LEO GROSS, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 214-20 (1984);
G.W. Haight, The New International Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States, 9 INT'L LAW. 591, 597 (1975).
127. See, e.g., OBED Y. AsAMoAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 2 (1966); BLAINE SLOAN, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS IN OUR CHANGING WORLD 53-76 (1991). As Saffo has suggested "[i]t is
axiomatic that the General Assembly possesses no formal competence to attribute binding legal force to
externally directed resolutions. At the same time, however, it is equally true that such recommendations
often have undeniable legal or political effects quite out of proportion to their formal recommendatory
status." Paul Laurence Saffo, The Common Heritage of Mankind: Has the General Assembly Created a
Law to Govern Seabed Mining?, 53 TUL. L. REv. 492, 508 (1979).
128. As Sloan has suggested, "every resolution ... is part of the raw material from which custom is
made and therefore a material source of international law." SLOAN, supra note 127, at 41. Similarly,
Lukashuk of the Institute of State and Law, USSR Academy of Sciences, has remarked that if General
Assembly Resolutions lacked any binding force, they would be rendered "senseless, and the United
Nations would have lost an important instrument for influencing international relations . . . ." I.I.
Lukashuk, Recommendations of International Organisations in the International Normative System, in
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methods are included in Article 38(1)(a)-(c) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ"), which is generally regarded as the most authoritative
statement on sources of international law.129
1. Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions as Authentic
Interpretations of the U.N. Charter: Article 38(1)(a) of the Statute
of the ICJ
It is possible that declaratory General Assembly resolutions may gain legal
effect if they constitute authentic interpretations of the U.N. Charter, which itself is
a treaty and valid source of international law under Article 38(1)(a) of the Statute
of the ICJ.130 The putative basis for such interpretations is found in Articles 10,
11(1), and 13(l)(a) of the Charter. 131 The former states:
[t]he General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters
within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and
functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except
as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members
of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such
questions or matters.132
Article 11(1) provides:
[t]he General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-
operation in the maintenance of international peace and security,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 35 (W.E. Butler ed., 1987). See also HANNA
BOKOR-SZEGO, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 71-74 (1978);
INGRID DELUPIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 13-14 (1st ed. 1974); J.G.
STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-53 (9th ed. 1984); Gregory Marchildon &
Edward Maxwell, Quebec's Right of Secession Under Canadian and International Law, 32 VA. J. INT'L
L. 583, 604 (1992).
129. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 ("The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States; (b) international custom, as evidence of
a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d)
subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.").
130. The term "authentic" is used here, as opposed to "authoritative" as on balance, the former
seems to be the most correct. See INGRID DETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 227-29 (1994);
Oscar Schachter, Interpretation of the Charter in the Political Organs of the United Nations, in LAW,
STATE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HANS KELSEN 271 (Salo
Engel & Rudolf A. Mtall eds., 1964); Kay Hailbronner & Eckart Klein, Functions and Powers:
Article 10, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 237 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994);
Jean-Frangois Gareau, Shouting at the Wall: Self-Determination and the Legal Consequences of the
Construction ofa Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 489, 500 (2005).
131. Binder, for example, explicitly characterizes the Friendly Relations Declaration as an
authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Charter: "[t]he Declaration on Friendly Relations, defining the
right of self-determination, is generally viewed as an authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Charter."
Binder, supra note 13, at 236 n.52. See also G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
132. U.N. Charter art. 10.
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including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of
armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such
principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.133
Article 13(l)(a) provides:
[t]he General Assembly shall initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of:
a. promoting international co-operation in the political field and
encouraging the progressive development of international law
and its codification.' 34
The central question, therefore, is whether a qualified right to UNC secession
might gain legal effect by expression in a declaratory resolution purporting to
interpret the U.N. Charter through Articles 10, 11(1), or 13(1)(a). The most likely
declaration to fulfil this requirement is the Friendly Relations Declaration, which
declares principles of international law, friendly relations, and cooperation among
states in accordance with the UN. Charter.1 3 Examination of the Declaration's
draft history strongly suggests that it was intended to operate pursuant to Article
13(1)(a) of the U.N. Charter. Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1815,136 for instance,
enunciated that the General Assembly "[r]esolves to undertake, pursuant to Article
13 of the Charter a study of the principles of international law concerning friendly
relations and cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter with a view
to their progressive development and codification, so as to secure their more
effective application." 37 A later instrument relevant to the drafting of the Friendly
Relations Declaration-Resolution 1966 '-also implicitly alluded to Article
13(1)(a) in its preambular paragraph:
[rjecalling its resolutions 1505 (XV) of 12 December 1960, 1686 (XVI)
of 18 December 1961 and 1815 (XVII) of 18 December 1962, which
affirm the importance of encouraging the progressive development of
international law and its codification and making it a more effective
means of furthering the purposes and principles set forth in Articles 1
and 2 of the U.N. Charter.' 39
Finally, if any doubt need be eradicated, the sixteenth preambular paragraph of the
Friendly Relations Declaration explicitly describes the seven principles contained
therein as the "progressive development and codification" of international law.140
Thus, it is clear that the principles contained in the Declaration are designed to
operate pursuant to Article 13(l)(a) of the U.N. Charter.
133. Id. art. 11, para. 1.
134. Id. art. 13, para. 1.
135. The long title of the Declaration reflects such a linkage. See G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9.
136. G.A. Res. 1815 (XVII), art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/17/1815 (Dec. 18, 1962).
137. Id. (emphasis omitted).
138. G.A. Res. 1966 (XVIII), pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/18/1966 (Dec. 16, 1963).
139. Id.
140. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, pmbl.
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At this point it is apposite to note that the Friendly Relations Declaration has
been invoked and endorsed by subsequent declaratory General Assembly
resolutions, such as the Definition of Aggression, 4 1 the Declaration on the
Admissibility of Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States,142 the Manila
Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes,143 the Declaration on the
Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or
Use of Force in International Relations,'" the Declaration on the Prevention and
Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and
Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field, 45 and the Fiftieth
Anniversary Declaration. Accordingly, it can be argued that these instruments also
purport to operate vicariously pursuant to Article 13(l)(a).
The next question, therefore, concerns the actual scope and intent of Article
13(1)(a). Does it allow for authentic interpretations of the U.N. Charter by the
General Assembly ("GA")? Scholars, such as Hailbronner and Klein, are of the
clear opinion that it does not:
Of course, the resolutions of the GA could have a binding effect if the
GA were entitled to make authentic and binding interpretations of the
Charter. Such a power was, however, expressly denied the. GA at the
founding conference in San Francisco. The Belgian proposal already
made at the Dumbarton Oaks conference, namely to incorporate a
provision to that effect into the Charter, was unsuccessful. Judgments of
the ICJ thus far have not contradicted this point. In the advisory opinion
of July 20, 1962 . . . (Expenses case), the ICJ acknowledged that every
organ itself must in the first instance interpret the specifications of its
competence as laid down in the Charter; there is, however, no mention
of a binding effect on the member states. It follows that the GA does not
enjoy a privilege of interpretation; this would require an alteration to the
Charter under Arts. 108 and 109.146
When trying to assess the scope of Article 13(l)(a), it is worth recalling that
Article 13(1) provides that the General Assembly "shall initiate studies and make
recommendations."47 Article 13(1) does not, therefore, mandate that the General
Assembly may make legally binding determinations. On the contrary, it merely
suggests the Assembly may adopt a recommendatory role.148 This more limited
141. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
142. G.A. Res. 36/103, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (Dec. 9, 1981).
143. G.A. Res. 37/10, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/10 (Nov. 15, 1982).
144. G.A. Res. 42/22, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/22 (Nov. 18, 1987).
145. G.A. Res. 43/51, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/51 (Dec. 5, 1988).
146. Hailbronner & Klein, supra note 130, at 237-38 (citations omitted). See also Villiger who
notes, in perhaps less equivocal terms, that "[r]esolutions can, of course, have certain effect. They may
amount to an authoritative-though not necessarily authentic-interpretation of the Charter." MARK E.
VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 125 (2d ed. 1997).
147. U.N. Charter art. 13, para. I (emphasis added).
148. VILLAGER, supra note 146, at 124.
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scope is supported by the wording of Article 13(l)(a), which provides that such
recommendations are designed to "encourag[e] the progressive development of
international law and its codification."l 49 The use of the words "encourage" and
the phrase "progressive development" both suggest that Article 13(l)(a) is
predominantly concerned with the development of international law de lege
ferenda. Article 13(1)(a) does, however, also include the word "codification,"
which may arguably denote a more positivist de lege lata function. When trying to
determine the difference between the terms "progressive development" and
"codification" it is useful to consider the maiden report of the Committee on the
Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification 5 0 (the
Committee of Seventeen):
The Committee recognized that the tasks entrusted by the General
Assembly to the Commission might vary in their nature. Some of the
tasks might involve the drafting of a convention on a subject which has
not yet been regulated by international law or in regard to which the law
has not been highly developed or formulated in the practice of States.
Other tasks might, on the other hand, involve the more precise
formulation and systemization of law in areas where there has been
extensive State practice precedent and doctrine. For convenience of
reference, the Committee has referred to the first type of task as
'progressive development' and to the second type of task as
'codification.' The Committee recognizes that the terms employed are
not mutually exclusive, as, for example, in cases where the formulation
and systemization of the existing law may lead to the conclusion that
some new rule should be suggested for adoption by States . ... For the
codification on international law, the Committee recognized that no
clear-cut distinction between the formulation of the law as it is [lex lata]
and the law as it ought to be [lexferenda] could be rigidly maintained in
practice. It was pointed out that in any work of codification, the codifier
inevitably has to fill the gaps and amend the law in light of new
developments.15 1
The foregoing would therefore seem to indicate that instruments adopted by the
General Assembly under Article 13(l)(a) may contain elements of both lex lata
and lexferenda.
149. U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1(a).
150. The Committee was established by General Assembly Resolution 94 (1). G.A. Res. 94 (I), 1 3,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/94 (I) (Dec. 11, 1946). Based on the maiden report of the Committee, the General
Assembly at its second session established the International Law Commission and approved its statute
via General Assembly Resolution 174 (II). G.A. Res. 174 (II), .4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/174(II) (Nov. 21,
1947). See Carl-August Fleischhauer, Article 13, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 265, 268 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994).
151. Report of the Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and its
Codification on the Methods for Encouraging the Progressive Development of International Law and
its Eventual Codification, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 18, 20, 22 (1947). See also Fleischhauer, supra note 147.
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This conclusion is supported by examination of Article 15 of the Statute of
the International Law Commission,1 52 which defines "progressive development" as
"the preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been
regulated by international law or in regard to which law has not yet been
sufficiently developed in the practice of States."'5 A priori "progressive
development" may involve legal innovation beyond lex lata and thus constitute lex
ferenda. The same Article defines "codification" as "the more precise formulation
and systemization of rules of international law in fields where there has already
been extensive state practice, precedent and doctrine."l 54 A priori, "codification"
signifies the transfer of lex lata from jus non-scriptum to jus scriptum.15 5
Bearing in mind the foregoing observations, it is submitted here that the view
of scholars such as Arangio-Ruiz and Witten regarding the legal status of the
Friendly Relations Declaration is to be preferred. The former, for example, has
observed:
[t]he impact of the declaration on existing international law-and in
particular on the law of the United Nations (and mainly on the
Charter)-can thus be described in the sense that the declaration could
be considered per se neither as a part of customary or general
international law, nor as an authentic determination or interpretation of
custom or treaty. The declaration places itself below general-written
or unwritten-international law, below existing treaties, and, in
particular, below the Charter of the United Nations.
That does not exclude, of course, that the declaration could have an
'impact on the formulation, development and application of rules of
international law, whether customary or conventional.156
Witten has similarly concluded:
[t]he Declaration is tentative and ambiguous as to its very status. It
declares that, 'the principles of the Charter which are embodied in this
Declaration constitute basic principles of international law,' but does not
grant the actual Principles of the Declaration the same status . .. . The
Declaration, therefore, perceives itself as aspirational rather than
programmatic, as a guide rather than a mandate.' 5 7
This position is informed by analysis of Article 2 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration, which provides:
152. G.A. Res. 174, supra note 150, art. 15.
153. Id.
154. Id. See also Review of the Multilateral Treaty Making Process (Paragraph 2 of General
Assembly Resolution 32/48), [1979] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 183, 187, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/325.
155. VILLIGER, supra note 146, at 102.
156. GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ, THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS
AND THE SYSTEM OF THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (1979).
157. Roger M. Witten, The Declaration on Friendly Relations, 12 HARv. INT'L L.J. 509, 517
(1971).
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[n]othing in this declaration shall be construed as prejudicing in any
manner the provisions of the Charter or the rights of peoples under the
Charter taking into account the elaboration of these rights in this
declaration.' 58
Hence, Article 2 specifies that the Declaration does not enjoy a status equal to the
U.N. Charter, and furthermore, when construing the Charter's provisions, the
Declaration is clearly disqualified as an interpretative source. As Arangio-Ruiz
has poignantly noted, "the Charter is not tampered with by the declaration except
by way of exhortation."'59 A priori, the Declaration is not an extension of the
Charter.
Article 3 further holds that "[t]he principles of the Charter which are
embodied in this declaration constitute basic principles of international law."1 60
When read in conjunction with Article 2, which stipulates that the Declaration is of
no prejudice to the Charter's provisions, it is clear that only the content of the
Charter itself is regarded as international law pursuant to Article 38(1)(a) of the
Statute of the ICJ. 161
This interpretation of the Friendly Relations Declaration would seem to be
implicitly supported by the ICJ's reasoning in Nicaragua v. the United States of
America.162 Here-in the context of customary law-it was held that the assent by
states to the Friendly Relations Declaration afforded a prima facie indication as to
their opinio juris relating to matters contained therein.' 63 However, the ICJ ruled
that this presumption could be overcome in the event of conflicting state practice
in terms of physical acts and omissions. As such, the ICJ effectively ruled that
the Friendly Relations Declaration is not to be viewed in terms analogous to the
Charter itself.
This then leads to the consideration of whether the qualified right to UNC
secession contained in Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration could be validly incorporated into international law under the
combined operation of Article 13(l)(a) of the U.N. Charter and Article 38(l)(a) of
the Statute of the ICJ. Obviously, if the foregoing analysis is to be adopted, then
158. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
159. ARANGIO-RUIZ, supra note 156, at 96.
160. Id.
161. But see Oscar Schachter, The Relation ofLaw, Politics and Action in the United Nations, 109
RECUEIL DES COURS 169, 186 (1963) ("[t]he question of primary interest to the international lawyer has
generally been the extent to which the interpretations reached by, or within, the political organs are to
be regarded as legally authoritative when the organ has not been accorded the competence to make
binding decisions. In considering this, one might start with the principle that an 'authentic'
interpretation of a treaty by the parties is legally binding on them to the same degree as the treaty itself.
I believe it is generally accepted that this conclusion would hold for an interpretation of the Charter
adopted by all the Members (or even 'by the overwhelming majority' except for some abstentions) in
the General Assembly; the interpretation would be characterized by international lawyers as having the
same legal force as the Charter itself.").
162. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 107-08.
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only those matters contained within both the U.N. Charter and the Friendly
Relations Declaration can be considered lex lata. Matters beyond the scope of the
U.N. Charter cannot simply become lex lata by textual elaboration in the Friendly
Relations Declaration. It can be noted at this point that the U.N. Charter in Article
1(2) enshrines the "principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" but
that the drafting committee explicitly ruled out any grounds for unilateral secession
of any type through this provision: "the principle conformed to the purposes of the
Charter only in so far as it implied to the right of self-government of peoples, and
not the right of secession."165 Other aspects of the U.N. Charter, such as Chapters
XI and XII, implicitly suggest that self-determination equates with self-
government, which effectively means that metropolitan powers should
consensually grant self-government or independence to non-self-governing
peoples. Hence, it can be concluded that a right to UNC secession cannot be
incorporated into international law under the combined operation of Article
13(l)(a) of the U.N. Charter and Article 38(1)(a) of the Statute of the ICJ.
2. Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions as Customary Law:
Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ
The following section discusses the legal status of declaratory General
Assembly resolutions vis-a-vis customary law. Specifically, it examines four
questions: first, whether statements, such as those contained in declaratory General
Assembly resolutions, constitute customary law; second, whether various types of
state practice are accorded different weight; third, whether textual repetition of a
doctrine is necessary for solidification of a customary rule; and fourth, how the
requirement of opiniojuris impacts upon customary law formation.
i. Are Statements Included Under Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the
ICJ?
Article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ lists "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice" as one source of international law.,66 The debate
over the precise definition of "general practice" has been extensive and
controversial. D'Amato, for example, has adopted a restrictive interpretation of
general practice whereby only physical acts qualify: "a claim is not an act . . . .
Claims . . . although they may articulate a legal norm cannot constitute the material
component of custom."l 67 This restrictive view, which would seem to deny the
salience of declaratory General Assembly resolutions as evidence of state practice,
165. United Nations Conference on International Organization, S.F., Cali., Apr. 25-June 26, 1945,
Summary Report of Sixth Meeting of Committee I/I, 1(A), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.343 1/1/16 (Vol. VI)
(May 16, 1945) (emphasis added). See BUCHHEIT, supra note 48, at 73-74; W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, supra
note 48, at 353.
166. See BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 4; SLOAN, supra note 127, at 53.
167. ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (1971)
(emphasis added).
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has been supported by Judge Read's Dissenting Opinion in the Fisheries Case
(U.K. v. Norway):1
68
Customary international law . . . cannot be established by citing cases
where coastal States have made extensive claims, but have not
maintained their claims by the actual assertion of sovereignty over
foreign ships [physical acts] . . . . The only convincing evidence of
State practice is to be found in seizures, where the coastal State asserts
its sovereignty over trespassing foreign ships.'6 9
Still, this relatively narrow view has been ignored by subsequent ICJ cases, such as
the Asylum Case,'70 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,171 Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case (U.K. v. Iceland),172 Rights of United States Nationals in Morocco Case
(United States v. France), Nicaragua v. the United States ofAmerica,174 and the
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,'7 5 all of which viewed claims-and not just
physical acts and omissions-as relevant to the field of state practice.
A slightly different interpretation of Article 38(1)(b) has been proffered by
Thirlway, who argues that state practice can include claims and other
diplomatic/political statements, but only if they relate to concrete situations and are
not merely in abstracto.'7 6 Accordingly, general statements of principle such as
that espoused in declaratory General Assembly resolutions are not included under
this definition:
[T]he occasion of an act of State practice contributing to the
formation of custom must always be some specific dispute or
potential dispute.
The mere assertion in abstracto of the existence of a legal right
or legal rule is not an act of State practice; but it may be adduced
as evidence of the acceptance by the State against which it is
sought to set up the claim, of the customary rule which is alleged
168. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 191 (Dec. 18) (dissenting opinion of Judge Read).
169. Id. at 191.
170. Asylum (Colum. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20) (indicating the ICJ regarded the
actual exercise of diplomatic asylum and official views expressed in relation to diplomatic asylum as
both constituting valid examples of state practice).
171. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den./Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 32-33, 47, 53 (Feb.
20).
172. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 3, 47, 56-58, 81-88, 119-120, 135, 161 (July
25). In this case textual arguments between states in diplomatic correspondence or conferences on the
law of the sea were held to constitute state practice.
173. Rights of Nationals of The United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176,
200, 209 (Aug. 27). Here the ICJ looked for evidence of custom in diplomatic correspondence and
conference records.
174. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5, IT 188-89, 191,
202, 205.
175. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, $T 68-73.
176. H. W. A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE CONTINUING ROLE OF CUSTOM IN THE PRESENT PERIOD OF CODIFICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1972).
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to exist, assuming that State asserts that it is not bound by the
alleged rule. More important, such assertions can be relied on as
supplementary evidence both of state practice and of the
existence of the opinio juris; but only as supplementary
evidence.
Practice or usage consists of an accumulation of acts which are
material or concrete in the sense that they are intended to have an
immediate effect on the legal relationships concerned.'"
Thirlway's argument does, however, suffer from a number of deficiencies. It
would seem obvious, for instance, that when a state makes a statement in
abstracto, it may actually be intending the remark to apply to a specific situation.
For reasons of diplomacy though, the state making the statement may feel it is
simply more expedient to refrain from specific mention of the particular target
dispute or issue. On the other hand, a state's stance on a particular issue may be
shaped not by the specific issue at hand, but instead the desire to solidify a general
principle. Hence, a reaction to a concrete and specific situation may be shaped by
principles in abstracto. When viewed this way, Thirlway's arguments, although
interesting, appear unjustifiably narrow. 78
Not surprisingly perhaps, Thirlway's views have not been reflected in judicial
reasoning. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,'79 for example, the ICJ
indicated that statements in abstracto could lead to the formation of a customary
rule of international law, provided such statements were framed de lege lata and
not de lege ferenda.80  Similar reasoning was employed in the Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Iceland),'8 ' where the ICJ cited a resolution passed by
the 1958 United Nations Law of the Sea Conference and an amendment tabled at
the 1960 Conference as state practice that had contributed to the creation of a
customary rule of international law.182 In the Barcelona Traction Case,'83 Judge
Ammoun, in his Separate Opinion, stated:
[t]he positions taken up by the delegates of States in international
organizations and conferences, and in particular in the United Nations,
naturally form part of State practice . . . [and] amount to precedents
contributing to the formation of custom.184
177. Id. at 58.
178. See Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BlIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 4
(1976).
179. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 171.
180. Id. at 38.
181. Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 172, at 26.
182. Id.
183. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 5).
184. Id. at 302-03.
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Similar views have been expressed in the South West Africa Cases,185
Nicaragua v. the United States ofAmerica,'8 6 and the Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion.187
The more appropriate view, therefore, is that statements, whether in relation
to concrete situations or in abstracto, provided they are framed de lege lata, are
capable of contributing to customary rules of international law. This broader view
has attracted support from numerous scholars. Akehurst, for example, has defined
state practice as "any act or statement . .. from which views [about customary law]
can be inferred", which includes physical acts, claims, declarations in abstracto
(such as General Assembly resolutions), national laws, national judgments and
omissions. Customary law can also be created by the practice of international
organizations."188 Bailey has similarly maintained that "customary law consists of
the rules established by the general practice of states, which certainly includes their
diplomatic acts and public pronouncements."l 89 Dixon has adopted an analogous
definition: "state practice includes, but is not limited to, actual activity (acts and
omissions), statements made in respect of concrete situations or disputes,
statements of legal principle made in the abstract, such as those preceding the
adoption of a resolution of the General Assembly, national legislation and the
practice of international organizations."o90 Other scholars adopting similarly broad
definitions include Villiger,' 9 ' Brownlie,' 92 Shaw,' Higgins,194 Asamoah,'95
Castaneda,196 and Arangio-Ruiz.' 9 7
185. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Aft.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 291-92 (dissenting opinion
of Judge Tanaka).
186. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5, % 188-89, 191,
202, 205.
187. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, 1" 68-73.
188. Akehurst, supra note 178, at 10. See also GILLIAN D. TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 68 (2006).
189. Sir Kenneth Bailey, Making International Law in the United Nations, 61 AM. SOc'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 233, 235 (1967). Dixon shares a similar view. See MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-31 (6th ed. 2007). Sloan further suggests that as international organizations
are subjects of international law, organizational practice also bears upon the creation of custom. See
SLOAN, supra note 127, at 72.
190. DIXON, supra note 189, at 31.
191. Villiger elaborates that, "State practice includes any act, articulation or other behaviour of a
state, as long as the behaviour in question discloses the State's conscious attitude with respect to its
recognition of a customary rule." VILLIGER, supra note 146, at 16.
192. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 6.
193. SHAW, supra note 63, at 82.
194. ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 4-7 (1963).
195. OBED Y. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 52-5 7 (1966).
196. JORGE CASTA1fEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 168-69 (Leland M.
Goodrich & William T.R. Fox eds., 1969).
197. ARANGIO-RUIZ, supra note 156, at 40.
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ii. Various Forms of State Practice and the Relative Weight Thereof
Having determined that statements such as those contained in declaratory
General Assembly resolutions do constitute a valid source of customary law under
Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ, a further point of discussion is the
relative weight that might be afforded to different types of practice. In other
words, should the physical acts and omissions of states be accorded a higher
priority than statements, be the latter in abstracto or otherwise? If such a hierarchy
exists, it may be that the content of the declaratory General Assembly resolutions
such as the Friendly Relations Declaration, which contains a qualified right to
UNC secession, might be wholly negated or at least nullified by contrary physical
acts and omissions.
Very few scholars have examined this question in any detail. Akehurst,
however, has suggested that "[t]here is no compelling reason for attaching greater
importance to one kind of practice than to another."198 Similar remarks have been
made by Arangio-Ruiz, who has noted:
United Nations practice as a whole, inclusive of Assembly
recommendations, is an integral part of the practice of States. It is only
for reasons of practical convenience or scientific analysis that one
distinguishes between the practice of States in the United Nations and
States' practice at large; and it is only for such reasons that one may
want to isolate either United Nations practice as a whole or United
Nations resolutions from States' practice at large. In so far as United
Nations practice, and notably United Nations declarations are
concerned, the ascertained inexistence of any contractual or customary
rule qualifying Assembly declaratory resolutions as binding legal
instruments and the obvious inexistence of any rule qualifying United
Nations practice in a wide sense as of special legal value, exclude the
existence of any legal distinction either of United Nations practice as a
whole or of Assembly recommendations from States' practice at
large. 199
Hence, it seems that any attempt to discredit the relative value of declaratory
General Assembly resolutions vis-d-vis state practice at large is misguided. It must
be noted though that where a conflict exists between different types of state
practice, this will almost certainly prevent the formation of a customary rule.
iii. The Impact of Repetition
A further question requiring examination is to what extent the repetition of a
certain practice-such as the drafting of multiple declaratory General Assembly
resolutions supporting a qualified right to UNC secession-contributes to the
crystallization of a customary rule of international law. Intuitively it would seem
that repetition of a practice-be it statements or physical acts and omissions-
198. Akehurst, supra note 178, at 21.
199. ARANGIO-RUIZ, supra note 156, at 44.
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should be a precondition for the solidification of a customary rule. Surprisingly
though, analysis of case law suggests that repetition is not always a conditio sine
qua non. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Case,200 for example, the ICJ
indicated that limited practice may bring about the establishment of a new
customary rule of international law, particularly when the new rule is relatively
uncontroversial or established in vacuo.201 When a new rule is more controversial,
however, such as a qualified right to UNC secession, more extensive practice
seems necessary. In this regard it should be noted that a qualified right to UNC
secession has been articulated by the Friendly Relations Declaration and Fiftieth
Anniversary Declaration. This repetition certainly bolsters claims that a customary
rule of international law has been prima facie created.202 Once again, though, it
must be considered whether other forms of state practice, such as physical acts and
omissions, conflict with the aforementioned instruments. If a conflict does exist,
then this will thwart the creation of a customary rule.
iv. Opinio Juris
One final element of customary law requiring analysis is opinio juris.203
Article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ refers to "a general practice accepted as
law."204 The phrase "accepted as law" seems to imply that a practice will only
become customary law when accompanied with the requisite psychological belief
that such a practice is rendered obligatory.205 In many ways then, the requirement
of opinio juris is tautologous, requiring that states consider a given practice or
omission law before it is recognized as such.206 Regardless of these theoretical and
conceptual difficulties, the requirement of psychological belief is a necessary
ingredient for the formation of customary law. How this requisite psychological
component is identified depends on the nature of the dispute under consideration.
When dealing with relatively uncontroversial subject matter, the ICJ has, as
200. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 171, at 45.
201. Id. An example of a new rule established in vacua might be the creation of space law. See
Akehurst, supra note 178, at 13. But see Peter Malanczuk, Space Law as a Branch of International
Law, 25 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 143, 160-61 (1994).
202. South West Africa, supra note 185, at 291-93 (dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka)
(concluding that an accumulation of resolutions could precipitate the formation of a customary rule of
international law).
203. The Latin phrase "opinio juris" also referred to as "opinio juris sive necessitatis" was first
coined by the French scholar Frangois Gdny to differentiate legal custom from mere social usage. On
the subject of opinio juris, see SHAW, supra note 63, at 84-89; Oscar Schachter, New Custom: Power,
Opinio Juris and Contrary Practice, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE
21ST CENTURY 531, 531-32 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).
204. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 129, art. 38(l)(b) (emphasis added).
205. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 8; DIXON, supra note 189, at 34.
206. DIXoN, supra note 189, at 35. D'Amato remarks "[blow can custom create law if its
psychological component requires action in conscious accordance with law pre-existing the action?"
D'AMATO, supra note 167, at 66. Triggs has noted "the test of opiniojuris is circular." TRIGGS, supra
note 188, at 49.
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evidenced by the Gulf of Maine Case,207 been willing simply to equate opiniojuris
with general practice.208 When the subject matter is controversial, however, the
ICJ has imposed a more exacting test to determine the requisite psychological
belief. It is submitted that the latter approach is the most relevant to the present
study, which is concerned with the controversial subject of UNC secession.
Regarding this second approach to opinio juris, three cases are particularly
instructive, the first of which is the Lotus Case. 209 Here the Permanent Court of
International Justice ("PCIJ") stated:
[e]ven if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found among the
reported cases were sufficient to prove in point of fact the circumstances
alleged by the Agent for the French Government, it would merely show
that States had often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal
proceedings, and not that they recognized themselves as being obliged
to do so; for only if such abstention were based on their being a
conscious duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an
international custom. The alleged fact does not allow one to infer that
States have been conscious of having such a duty; on the other hand ...
there are other circumstances calculated to show the contrary is true.210
As Brownlie has suggested, the above reasoning applies with equal relevance to
proactive state conduct.2 11
A very similar approach was taken in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case,212
where the ICJ stated that in order for a customary rule of international law to be
created,
[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they
must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to evidence a
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule
of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a
subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of opinio juris sive
necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or
even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are
many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol,
which are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by
considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any
sense of legal duty.2 13
207. Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), 1984 1.C.J. 246, 293-
94 (Oct. 12).
208. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 8.
209. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 at 18 (Sept. 7).
210. Id. at 28; see also BRowNLIE, supra note 72, at 9.
211. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 9.
212. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 171, at 44.
213. Id. See BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 9; VILLIGER, supra note 146, at 47; Akehurst, supra note
178, at 31-32.
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Hence, it follows that a particular (ongoing) practice will become customary law
provided it is accompanied by the requisite psychological belief.
In the later case of Nicaragua v. the United States of America,214 the ICJ
reiterated this traditional formulation when it stated:
[i]n considering the instances of the conduct above described, the Court
has to emphasize that, as was observed in the North Sea Continental
Shelf cases, for a new rule of customary law to be formed, not only must
the acts concerned 'amount to a settled practice,' but they must be
accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitatis. Either the State
taking such action or other States in a position to react to it, must have
behaved so that their conduct is 'evidence of a belief that this practice is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The
need for such as belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is
implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitates.'215
However, Nicaragua also developed a new variant of opinio juris relating
specifically to declaratory General Assembly resolutions. This new variant
contained a two-stage test: first, that opinio juris could be prima facie deduced
from widespread state acceptance of declaratory General Assembly resolutions,
such as the Friendly Relations Declaration, and second, that such opinio juris
would be legally perfected by concomitant state physical acts and omissions. The
first stage of the test was enunciated by the ICJ as follows:
[O]piniojuris may, though with all due caution, be deduced from, inter
alia, the attitude of the Parties and the attitude of States towards certain
General Assembly resolutions, and particularly resolution 2625(XXV)
entitled 'Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations.' The effect of consent to the text of
such resolutions cannot be understood as merely that of a 'reiteration or
elucidation' of the treaty commitment undertaken in the Charter. On the
contrary, it may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of the
rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves.2 16
The Court continued:
As already observed, the adoption by States of this text [the Friendly
Relations Declaration] affords an indication of their opinio juris as to
customary international law on the question. 21 7
214. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5.
215. Id. 207.
216. Id. T 188.
217. Id. T 191. Franck has opined that "[t]he effect of this enlarged concept of the lawmaking force
of . . . General Assembly resolutions" is that it "may well . . . caution states to vote against
'aspirational' instruments' if they do not intend to embrace them totally and at once, regardless of
circumstance." Thomas M. Franck, Some Observations on the ICJ's Procedural and Substantive
Innovations, 81 AM. J. INT'L L 116, 119 (1987). Whilst Franck's observation is valid, as Judge
Schwebel pointed out in a 1972 Hague lecture, the Friendly Relations Declaration was "adopted by
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The second stage of the test was enunciated by the Court when determining
the binding nature of the principle of non-intervention:
Notwithstanding the multiplicity of declarations by States accepting the
principle of non-intervention, there remain two questions: first, what is
the exact content of the principle so accepted, and secondly, is the
practice sufficiently in conformity with it for this to be a rule of
customary international law? 218
This new variant of opinio juris-fashioned with direct reference to declaratory
General Assembly Resolutions-would seem to contradict the more traditional
formulation, as expressed in the Lotus Case and North Sea Continental Shelf Case,
which provided that opinio juris could only be ascertained after a succession of
consistent state acts or omissions accompanied by the requisite psychological
belief that such acts or omissions were rendered legally obligatory. As
commentators such as Schachter have observed, this new variant of opiniojuris
was seen by some critics as standing custom[ary law] on its head. In
place of a practice that began with the gradual accretion of acts and
subsequently received the imprimatur of opinio juris, the Court reversed
the process: an opinio juris expressed first as a declaration would
become law if confirmed by general practice.219
Accordingly, without a synchronicity between declaratory General Assembly
resolutions and state practice in terms of physical acts and omissions, a binding
rule of customary law cannot be created.
It is clear that Article 38(1)(b) of the Statue of the ICJ includes statements
such as those contained in declaratory General Assembly resolutions. It is clear
also that textual statements are not per se subordinated to other forms of state
practice, such as physical acts and omissions. All forms of state practice are
relevant to the formation of a customary rule and must be considered concurrently.
Repetition of a certain practice strengthens the claim that a customary rule of
international law has been created, although this repetition must be accompanied
by the requisite opinio juris. As indicated by Nicaragua v. the United States of
acclamation and accepted by the General Assembly as declaratory of international law." Schwebel
holds the same opinion regarding the Definition of Aggression. S.M. Schwebel, Aggression,
Intervention and Self-Defence, 136 RECUEIL DES COURs 411, 452 n.1 1 (1972). Supporting this view,
Schachter remarks that "[m]ost states, including the United States, refer frequently to this resolution
[the Friendly Relations Declaration] as an authoritative expression of the law of the Charter and related
customary law." Oscar Schachter, Just War and Human Rights, 1 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1989).
218. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5, 205. Earlier, the
Court noted that "[t]he existence in the opinio juris of States of the principle of non-intervention is
backed by established and substantial practice." Id. at 106, 202.
219. Schachter, supra note 203, at 531-32. Rijpkema has similarly noted in the context of
Nicaragua that "[t]his term [opinio juris] which refers to the legal convention of States, is apparently
given a broader meaning than usual in the Nicaragua case. It transpires that manifestations of States'
legal conventions do not necessarily need to relate to acts of States which constitute a settled practice in
order to be identified as statement of opinio juris." P. P. Rijpkema, Customary Law in the Nicaragua
Case, 20 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 91, 92-93 (1989).
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America,220 where a conflict exists between various forms of state practice, opinio
juris cannot be decisively determined from textual elaboration alone: an enquiry of
state practice in terms of physical acts and omissions is also necessary.221 If,
therefore, state physical acts and omissions are concomitant with the qualified right
to UNC secession contained in instruments such as, inter alia, the Friendly
Relations Declaration and Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration, a de lege lata legal
right would be established under Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ.
3. Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions as General Principles
of International Law: Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ
Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ lists "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" as a source of international law. 222  As with
Article 38(1)(b), the precise scope and meaning of this provision is
controversial.223 The orthodox view, favoured by scholars such as Brownlie,224
Dixon,225 Shaw,226 Glahn,227 Guggenheim, 228  229 de Lupis,230 and Virally, 231
maintains that the section merely alludes to rules and principles common to all
developed legal systems. Such rules and principles include the notions that
persons are entitled to go before an impartial court to settle disputes and have the
right to be heard before judgment is pronounced. It was also suggested by Judge
McNair in the International Status of South West Africa Case232 that certain
substantive domestic law concepts might be incorporated into international law
under Article 38(1)(c). 233 Thus, legal concepts such as trusts (International Status
of South West Africa Case),234 subrogation (Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions
220. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5.
221. Id. 188, 189, 191, 202, 205.
222. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 129, art. 38(1)(c).
223. SLOAN, supra note 129, at 77; G.J.H VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 131-51 (1983); Hermann Mosler, General Principles of Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 90-92 (7th ed. 1984).
224. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 18.
225. DIXON, supra note 189, at 39.
226. SHAW, supra note 63, at 99.
227. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-24 (5th ed. 1986).
228. Paul Guggenheim, Contribution a l'histoire des sources du droit des gens, 94 RECUEIL DES
COURS 1, 79 (1958).
229. F.A. Mann, Reflections on a Commercial Law of Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 20, 20-51
(1957).
230. DETTER, suprb note 130, at 200-03.
231. Michel Virally, The Sources of International Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 116, 143-48 (Max Sorensen ed., 1968).
232. International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (July 11).
233. Id. at 148; DIxON, supra note 189, at 39. See also Lord McNair, The General Principles of
Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 1-19 (1957).
234. International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 148 (July 11)
(separate opinion of Sir Arnold McNair).
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Case), 235 and limited liability (Barcelona Traction Case)236 might be incorporated
under this section. Further, general notions of equity have been incorporated in
cases such as the Diversion of Water from the Meuse Case (Netherlands v.
Belgium),237 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,238 Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina
23924Faso v. Mali),29 and Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Iceland).240
In addition to these overarching rules and principles derived from domestic
legal systems, it has been suggested that Article 38(l)(c) enlivens general
principles peculiar to the international system.241 This would include notions such
as the sovereign equality of states and the right of any state to exclusive control
over its sovereign jurisdiction.242 Article 38(l)(c) may also allow the incorporation
of more progressive general principles, such as the notion that states are prohibited
from inflicting environmental pollution upon the territory of other states.243 In the
Nuclear Test Case (New Zealand v. France)244 for example, Judge Weeramantry
suggested that there is "a fundamental principle of environmental law which must
be noted. It is well entrenched in international law . . .. that no nation is entitled by
its own activities to cause damage to the environment of any other nation." 245
Clearly, Judge Weeramantry was appealing to the operation of Article 38(1)(c) to
support his position. If, therefore, it is acceptable to appeal to Article 38(1)(c) in
the environmental realm, the question arises whether the provision can also be
enlivened to incorporate a qualified right to UNC secession vis-a-vis declaratory
General Assembly resolutions.
With the growth of human rights law since the U.N.'s inception, it may be
arguable that certain general principles of international law have developed
enshrining the right of individuals and peoples to freedom from persecution and
systematic unremitting discrimination. Indeed the U.N. instruments hitherto
examined provide tangible evidence that human rights law is an immutable (and
ever growing) force within contemporary international law. From this premise,
235. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3, at 17-18
(Aug. 30); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 472.
236. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, supra note 183, at 154-55 (separate opinion
of Judge Tanaka); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 18; SHAW, supra note 63, at 105.
237. Diversion of Water from Meuse (Neth v. Beig.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70 at 73, 77
(June 28) (individual opinion by Judge Hudson). See SHAW, supra note 63 at 106; BROWNLIE, supra
note 72, at 25-26; TRIGGS, supra note 188, at 89.
238. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 171, at 53-54.
239. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), 1986 1.C.J. 554, 631-63 (equity in territorial delimitation).
See DIXON, supra note 189, at 40; SHAW, supra note 63, at 108-109.
240. Here the ICJ sought "an equitable solution derived from the applicable law." Fisheries
Jurisdiction, supra note 172, at 33. See DIXON, supra note 189, at 40; SHAW, supra note 63, at 107
n.159.
241. DixoN, supra note 189, at 41.
242. Id. at 40-41.
243. Id.
244. Request for Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of Court's Judgment
of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 346 (Sept. 22) (dissenting opinion
of Judge Weeramantry).
245. Id. at 346-47; DIXON, supra note 189, at 43.
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therefore, can it be extrapolated that a qualified right to UNC secession exists
pursuant to Article 38(l)(c)?
To propound such a view would certainly be contrary to orthodoxy. Some
scholars though, such as Fitzmaurice, maintain that section 38(l)(c) is designed to
incorporate natural law doctrines which have supervening legal validity, such as
the protection of human rights and the prohibition of genocide. 246 According to
this view, it is perhaps feasible to include a qualified right to UNC secession as a
general principle.
The view that a combination of natural law doctrines and declaratory General
Assembly resolutions might provide grounds for a qualified right to UNC
secession is, however, highly controversial. As scholars such as Dixon have
argued, although principles such as respect for human rights and the prohibition of
genocide are universal, their legal authority is, in the main, derived from treaty and
customary law-Articles 38(l)(a) and (b) respectively. 247 Questions such as "how
should natural law be determined?" and "to what extent can states rely upon their
individual subjective natural law interpretations?" pose significant conceptual
problems. In short, it is very difficult to argue persuasively that a combination of
natural law doctrines and declaratory General Assembly resolutions might create a
general principle of international law that would be binding upon the international
community.
An alternative strategy for incorporating a right to UJNC secession under
Article 38(1)(c) is the notion that declaratory General Assembly resolutions, by
virtue of propounding certain overarching legal principles, ipso facto, constitute a
valid source of international law. Schermers, for example, has suggested:
[t]o a large extent, all law making resolutions of the universal
organizations adopted by a vast majority of States represent general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations, the adoption in itself
248constituting recognition.
Mendelson suggests a slightly more cautious interpretation:
[I]n certain very limited circumstances a General Assembly Resolution
may constitute, or bring about the birth of, a principle of international
law [pursuant to Article 38(1)(c)].2 49
However, like the natural law arguments explored above, this approach is
beset with difficulties. To equate principles espoused in declaratory General
246. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law,
in SYMBOLAE VERZUL 174 (F. M. van Asbeck, et al. eds., 1958).
247. DIXON, supra note 189, at 40. For a brief critique of natural law, see Youri Rechetov,
International Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, in U.N. LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:
Two ToPIcs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 237, 237-38 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979).
248. HENRY G. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: FUNCTIONING AND LEGAL
ORDER 613 (1972).
249. Maurice Mendelson, The Legal Character of General Assembly Resolutions: Some
Considerations of Principle, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 95,
102-03 (Kamal Hossain ed., 1980).
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Assembly resolutions with general principles of international law overlooks the
inherently political nature of the General Assembly and incorrectly assigns it a
primarily legislative role. The dangers of taking such an approach are manifold:
states will be less inclined to accept progressive declaratory General Assembly
resolutions, and this in turn will stymie the evolution of international law pursuant
to section 38(l)(b). Furthermore, the view of Schermers and Mendelson also
seems to impute a similar function to Articles 38(1)(b) and 38(1)(c), thereby
rendering the latter somewhat pleonastic. Not only that, but it also dispenses with
many of the legal criteria traditionally associated with section 38(1)(b) such as
opinio juris and the need for synchronicity between declaratory General Assembly
resolutions and state practice in terms of physical acts and omissions, as outlined
by the ICJ in Nicaragua v. the United States of America.250 Thus, to assert that a
qualified right to UNC secession can be elevated to a general principle of
international law pursuant to Article 38(1)(c) is conceptually problematic.
In light of the difficulties associated with natural law and quasi-legislative
interpretations, the view of scholars such as Arangio-Ruiz, Hailbronner, and Klein
regarding Article 38(1)(c) is to be preferred. The former, for example, has
asserted:
[i]n conformity with the finding that Assembly resolutions are not
binding legal instruments, declarations are not per se sufficient to create
principles of international law. This follows from the fact that principles
become part of the body of international law only in so far as they enter
therein through the law-making processes of international society:
mainly.. . through custom or agreement. 251
Hailbronner and Klein have similarly suggested that "it is not possible to classify
the content of the resolutions of the GA under Art. 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute."252
Hence, it is most probable that Article 38(1)(c) refers to rules and principles
common to developed domestic legal systems. Accordingly, the qualified right to
UNC secession contained in declaratory General Assembly resolutions would be
more appropriately incorporated into international law under Article 38(1)(b).
4. Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions as "Consensus":
Beyond Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ
Moving beyond the traditional sources of international law contained in
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, it is arguable that declaratory General
Assembly resolutions also constitute sources of international law purely on the
basis of consensus. Falk, for instance, has postulated that consensus is replacing
consent as the basis of international legal obligations. 253 Other scholars, such as
250. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5, % 188-89, 191,
202, 205.
251. ARANGIO-RUIZ, supra note 156, at 70. See also DIXON, supra note 189, at 40-41.
252. Hailbronner & Klein, supra note 130, at 239.
253. Falk has written that "there is discernible a trend from consent to consensus as the basis of
international legal obligations." Richard A. Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence ofthe General
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D'Amato, appear somewhat sympathetic to this position, suggesting that consensus
is international law.254
This prompts the question: what exactly does "consensus" mean? Sloan has
suggested that "consensus is a method for reaching a decision without voting in the
absence of formal objection." 255  Suy has similarly suggested that consensus
connotes a positive attitude to the substance of a text and that "fundamental
reservations would be contrary to the very idea of the non-objection procedure." 256
D'Amato has defined consensus as "complete unanimity" or "near unanimity with
,,257a few abstentions. Importantly, "consensus" was defined in Article 161(8)(e)
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as "the absence of
any formal objection." 258 This definition has been adopted mutatis mutandis by
Article 2(4), Note 1 of Annex 2 of the 1994 World Trade Organization's
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.259
It would thus seem that the widespread acceptance of declaratory General
Assembly resolutions with "the absence of any formal objection" would perhaps
satisfy the criteria of consensus as a non-orthodox mode of law creation.
According to this view instruments such as the Friendly Relations Declaration-
which were adopted without formal objection-may impose binding obligations
upon the world community. Hence, the qualified right to UNC secession espoused
in Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration may impose a
binding legal obligation upon states.
Whether consensus is a viable mode of international law creation is a moot
point. For such a proposition to be prima facie accepted, the content of the
declaration must propound the law de lege lata, not de legeferenda. Furthermore,
state practice in terms of physical acts and omissions must be concomitant with the
rule of law propounded, except in the rare situation where no previous example of
Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 785 (1966). See also Christoph Schreuer, Recommendations and the
Traditional Sources of International Law, 20 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 116, 116 (1977). But see Heinz
Guradze, Are Human Rights Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly Law Making?, 4
HUM. RTS. J. 453, 457 (1971); N.G. Onuf, Professor Falk on the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the
General Assembly, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 349, 351-52 (1970).
254. Anthony D'Amato, On Consensus, 8 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 106, 121 (1970). See also Samuel A.
Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of General Assembly Resolutions, 63 AM. J. INT'L L.
444, 447 (1969). But see N.G. Onuf, Further Thoughts on a New Source of International Law:
Professor D'Amato 's 'Manfest Intent', 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 774, 774-82 (1971).
255. SLOAN, supra note 127, at 87.
256. Eric Suy, Consensus, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 49, 51 (Rudolf
Bernhardt ed., 1981).
257. See D'Amato, supra note 254, at 106. It should be noted, though, that this definition is
inferred from a reading of his article as a whole.
258. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 161(8)(e), Dec. 10, 1982, available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/conventionagreements/texts/unclosfUNCLOS-TOC.htm.
259. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 2(4), note
1, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 ("The DSB shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter
submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting of the DSB when the decision is
taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.").
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state practice exists, as with space law. 26 Hence, where state practice in terms of
physical acts and omissions is clearly and overwhelmingly contrary to the textual
content of such an instrument, it is unlikely that a binding rule of law could be said
to have solidified by way of consensus.261 For this reason, it is submitted that the
consensus approval of declaratory General Assembly resolutions containing a
qualified right to UNC secession probably does not impose concrete legal
obligations. Even if one were to discount the role of state physical acts and
omissions, there is still the lingering conceptual problem of assigning the General
Assembly a quasi-legislative function, which member states do not have any
reason to accept in positive legal terms. Indeed most state action vis-c'a-vis support
for various resolutions-declaratory and non-declaratory-is granted under the
proviso that the General Assembly is primarily a forum for political expression-
not a legislative chamber.262
260. See generally BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 136-46 (1997).
261. Sloan seems to implicitly acknowledge this constraint. See SLOAN, supra note 127, at 88.
262. Nowhere in the text of the U.N. Charter, for instance, is the General Assembly attributed a
legislative function. Indeed, a proposal that the General Assembly should be endowed with a legislative
function at the 1945 San Francisco conference was resoundingly rejected. The Philippines delegation
proposed that "[t]he General Assembly should be vested with the legislative authority to enact rules of
international law which should become effective and binding upon members of the Organization after
such rules have been approved by the majority vote of the Security Council. Should the Security
Council fail to act on any of such rules within a period of thirty days after submission thereof to the
Security Council, the same should become effective and binding as if approved by the Security
Council." See United Nations Conference on International Organization, S.F., Cali., Apr. 25-June 26,
1945, Proposed Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Submitted by the Philippine
Delegation, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/Gl4(k) (Vol. 3), art. VIII, 9 (May 5, 1945); United Nations
Conference on International Organization, S.F., Cali., Apr. 25-June 26, 1945, Agenda for Tenth Meeting
of Committee II/2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.45511/220 (Vol. 9) (May 20, 1945). This proposal was defeated
by a vote of 26-1. Falk, supra note 253, at 783; Hailbronner & Klein, supra note 130, at 237. The ICJ
has explicitly and implicitly affirmed this position. In the South West Africa Cases, the Court noted that
"[r]esolutions of the United Nations General Assembly ... are not binding, but only recommendatory in
character." South West Africa, supra note 185, at 229-30 (dissenting opinion by Judge Wellington
Koo). Similar remarks were made by the Court in its Namibia Advisory Opinion. Legal Consequences
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Nothwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 6, 280-81 (Jan. 26) (dissenting
opinion by Judge Fitzmaurice). The Court implicitly affirmed such an interpretation in Nicaragua v. the
United States ofAmerica. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5,
99-101, 106-08. For the articulation of the argument that the General Assembly is not a legislative
forum, see the comments of Robert Rosenstock, acting as the U.S. Representative to the Sixth (Legal)
Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, namely, "[m]y government finds this statement startling
because it is open to the interpretation that this General Assembly, by its adoption of controverted
resolutions, 'develops' principles which arguably are of a legal character. This is an interpretation of the
powers and practice of this Assembly which is not accepted by my government, and which does not
conform to the United Nations Charter or to international law. This Assembly is not a lawmaking
body." John A. Boyd, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 375, 377 (1978)
(quoting Press Release, U.S./U.N., U.N. Press Release 112(77) (Nov. 11, 1977)).
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B. Distillation
The legal effect of declaratory General Assembly resolutions has been
examined from four perspectives: treaty law (Article 38(l)(a) of the Statute of the
ICJ and Article 13(1)(a) of the U.N. Charter), customary law (Article 38(1)(b) of
the Statute of the ICJ), general principles (Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute of the
ICJ), and consensus. Of the four approaches, customary law appears, on balance,
to be the most appropriate and orthodox avenue for declaratory General Assembly
resolutions containing a qualified right to UNC secession to gain concrete legal
effect. Suggestions, for example, that the Friendly Relations Declaration might
constitute an authentic interpretation of the U.N. Charter are not supported by close
analysis of the latter's Article 13(l)(a). Similarly, arguments pertaining to the
incorporation of a qualified right to UNC secession via general principles, although
interesting, do not withstand conceptual scrutiny and are clearly discordant with
the preponderance of conventional legal opinion. Likewise, the unorthodox appeal
to consensus, made by scholars such as Falk and D'Amato, also seems
unsatisfactory. This is not to assert that the latter three methods are entirely devoid
of all merit for incorporating a qualified right to UNC secession in international
law; rather, that they are less likely to command widespread support and respect
from legal scholars and states alike.
V. CONCLUSION
A qualified right to UNC secession is contained in Principle 5, paragraph 7 of
the Friendly Relations Declaration and Article 1 of the Fiftieth Anniversary
Declaration. It has been demonstrated that this right is most appropriately given
legal effect under Article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ. It remains, therefore,
to investigate whether such a customary law right would be legally perfected by
concomitant state practice in terms of physical acts and omissions, as indicated by
the ICJ in Nicaragua v. the United States of America.263 Such an investigation
would include, but not be limited to, acts of recognition in relation to UNC
secessionist disputes. Furthermore, it remains to be determined whether a general
customary law right to UNC secession would be enlivened by oppression against
peoples both in moderato (political, cultural, and racial discrimination) and in
extremis (ethnic cleansing, mass killings, and genocide). It will be recalled that the
textual articulation of the qualified right to UNC secession would appear to capture
both classes of oppression.
Although it is not the present article's purpose to venture an extended opinion
as to state practice in terms of physical acts and omissions, the following tentative
observations might nonetheless be made. It would seem that collectively UNC
secessionist case studies such as Bangladesh, the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus ("TRNC"), Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Kosovo, and South Sudan indicate
that only when human rights violations by the existing state are particularly
263. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5, 188-89, 191,
202, 205.
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extreme will a right to secession be perfected in international customary law. If
correct, this means that state practice in terms of recognition only supports UNC
secession when the people within the seceding entity have been subject to
oppression in extremis. This is perhaps explicable by the reluctance of states to
endorse freely a method of state creation that might undermine the well-entrenched
principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Although at present positive international law may only recognise a right to
UNC secession in response to the most egregious human rights violations, at a
normative level, this position must surely be open to question. In a fundamental
sense, states exist for the benefit of human beings, rather than vice versa. Should a
state cease to bestow the proper degree of human dignity upon its citizens, then it
is submitted that the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity must
yield to the right of peoples to self-determination. Put more overtly, in a normative
sense, there are strong reasons to argue that a right to UNC secession should be
available not just in response to human rights abuses in extremis, but also in
moderato. This position would seem to be reflected in the textual formulations of
the Friendly Relations Declaration and Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration. It would
also seem commensurate with the increasing emphasis being placed upon human
dignity and human rights throughout the international legal order.
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